COVID and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the vulnerability of global supply chains. Recognizing these risks, the EU launched a number of initiatives to prevent the weaponizing of supply chains and build resilience against interruptions. This article explores the EU’s attempts to ensure security of supply in three sectors: semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and critical raw materials. The analysis assesses the complex political and diplomatic trade-offs involved in what are often seen as primarily economic policies. The article argues that the EU’s moves to reduce strategic dependence is born of fear that crucial global supply chains are increasingly subject to political risk that could also stoke an anti-EU backlash. Seen from the perspective of the debate over the future of the liberal international order, the EU’s new “geo-dirigisme” implies also a questioning of the EU’s place in this order. If embedded liberalism meant preserving a space for national redistributive policies, embedding security of supply means carving out a space for states to insure against the pitfalls of interdependence. Consequently, as the EU and others take measures to address security of supply without relying purely on globalized supply chains, the liberal international order faces the acid test of its coordination capacity.