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Culture and Political Attitudes: The Assimilation of Immigrants in Western Europe

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Abstract

This paper examines differences in political attitudes between natives and immigrants in 23 European countries. Using six rounds of the European Social Survey (2010 - 2020), we find that foreign-born immigrants exhibit similar levels of trust in political institutions as observationally similar natives but hold more positive views on redistribution, gay rights, European integration, and immigration policy. Immigrants' age at migration is associated with larger opinion gaps regarding European integration and trust in political institutions. Additionally, attitudes toward immigration policy and trust in political institutions converge with those of natives for immigrants who migrated between the ages of 15 and 25, reaching parity 10 to 15 years after migration. Further analysis conducted at the subnational level reveals significant convergence between local political culture and the attitudes of first-generation immigrants. In matters of EU integration, migration policy, and trust in political institutions, this convergence is stronger among immigrants who migrated at a younger age and have resided in the host country for a longer period, suggesting a process of acculturation through direct interaction with natives. In contrast, the convergence of views on redistribution and gay rights appears to be independent of both age at migration and time since migration, indicating that immigrant preferences in these areas are more likely driven by self-selection and endogenous assimilation choices rather than acculturation.

JEL codes: D72, J15, P16, R23, Z1

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1 Introduction

Immigration is one of the most controversial issues in European politics. In the last decade, European citizens have increased their support for right-wing nationalist parties that promote strong anti-immigrant platforms (Campo et al., 2021; Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Dustmann et al., 2019; Halla et al., 2017). Some studies point to labor market competition and redistribution as the main concerns of natives, who fear that immigrants may “steal” their jobs or congest local public services and compositional amenities (Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Edo et al., 2019). Others have identified anxiety over cultural change, ethnic diversity or weakened social norms as the main drivers behind this growing opposition (see Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014)). Against this backdrop, the economic and social integration of immigrants has emerged as a critical challenge for host countries.

This paper contributes to the debate on integration by examining the political assimilation of immigrants at destination. Previous research has demonstrated that immigrants are frequently influenced by vertical transmission, defined as the process through which children adopt their parents’ behaviors, habits, and values. This transmission can exert a lasting effect on their political preferences, including attitudes toward redistribution (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Hammar, 2020), economic and civic behaviour (Aleksynska, 2011; Guiso et al., 2006; Greif and Tabellini, 2010; Henrich, 2000), racial tolerance (Kramer, 2023), interpersonal trust (Algan and Cahuc, 2010), or electoral choices (Just and Anderson, 2012).¹ The role of horizontal transmission — the process through which individuals adopt habits and values from outside the household (Bisin and Verdier, 2001) — in shaping the political attitudes of immigrants and their descendants in host societies remains less understood. Only a limited number of economic studies have explored the convergence of foreign-born residents toward country-specific political norms (Algan et al., 2012; Aleksynska, 2011; Giavazzi et al., 2019), and few have successfully identified the influence of the local environment on the political assimilation of immigrants (Bratsberg et al., 2021; Achard, 2022; Jaschke et al., 2022). This study contributes to the existing literature by examining the degree to which immigrants’ political views align with those of natives in Western Europe, and whether acculturation helps to explain the opinion gap between these groups.

We use data from six rounds of the European Social Survey, which provides detailed information on more than 165,000 native-born individuals and 14,000 foreign-born immigrants living in 130 regions across 23 European countries between 2010 and 2020. The ESS surveys respondents’ opinion on a range of political issues: redistribution, gay rights, European Union integration, immigration policy, and trust in political institutions. Drawing on prior evidence that immigrants’ exposure to their host society is a significant predictor of differences in political attitudes (Algan et al., 2012; Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010; Röder and Lubbers, 2016; Soehl, 2017), the first part of our empirical analysis compares foreign-born immigrants with observationally similar natives and investigates whether these political differences vary based on immigrants’ age at migration and time spent at destination. In the second part of the paper, we aim to isolate the ef-

¹Other works document the influence of vertical transmission regarding immigrants’ national identity (Monscheuer, 2020), family and social values (Fernández and Fogli, 2006a; Berggren et al., 2019), life satisfaction (Berggren et al., 2020), living arrangements (Giuliano, 2007), tax morale (Kountouris and Remoundou, 2013), and environmental issues (Litina et al., 2016).

fect of local political culture from other potential confounding factors, following the approach of [Tabellini \(2010\)](#). Local culture is defined as the average political preferences of native individuals residing in the same community as immigrants, measured using two alternative approaches. First, we define the community as individuals living in the same NUTS region. Alternatively, the community is defined as native peers residing in the same NUTS region and dwelling type, and who share the same age group and employment status as immigrants ([Senik, 2021](#)). We then analyze the extent to which immigrants' political preferences converge toward the local political culture of their community. Throughout the paper, particular attention is given to the mediating effect of the "impressionable years" (ages 18-25), which have been shown to play a pivotal role in the formation of political preferences ([Inglehart, 1971](#); [Krosnick and Alwin, 1989](#); [Bergh and Öhrvall, 2018](#); [Aksoy et al., 2020](#); [Bergh and Öhrvall, 2018](#); [Cotofan et al., 2022](#)).²

We find that foreign-born immigrants display levels of trust in political institutions that are similar to those of observationally identical natives. In contrast, they show more positive attitudes toward redistribution, gay rights, European integration, and immigration policy. With the exception of European integration, these differences do not intensify with immigrants' age at the time of migration. However, the gap in attitudes toward immigration policy and trust in political institutions reduces with time since migration for immigrants who arrived at destination between the age of 15 and 25. Those immigrants show identical views to those of natives on these issues 10 to 15 years after migrating. Moreover, we find significant convergence between local culture and the political preferences of first-generation immigrants. Further analysis reveals that this is contingent upon the degree of exposure to the host environment. Regarding migration policy and trust in political institutions, convergence is significantly stronger among foreign-born individuals who migrated at a younger age and spent more time at destination, which is consistent with a form of acculturation resulting from continuous, first hand contact between two distinct cultural groups. Attitudes toward EU integration show a similar pattern, though only when community preferences are defined at the regional level. In contrast, the convergence in preferences toward redistribution and gay rights does not depend on the age at migration or time since migration. This suggests that the assimilation of immigrants on these issues is not driven by acculturation over time. Rather, our findings on gay rights are consistent with the self-selection of foreign-born individuals who consciously choose to emigrate to regions and interact with native peers who share similar views. Moreover, the pattern of assimilation regarding redistribution aligns with the theory of endogenous assimilation, which posits that immigrants quickly adjust their political beliefs to host country norms on issues that provide direct transactional benefits.

This study contributes to the scholarship documenting the convergence of immigrants' political views to host country norms in matters of redistribution ([Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2015](#)), gay rights ([Röder, 2015](#)), and political trust ([Maxwell, 2010](#); [Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010](#); [Algan et al., 2012](#)). We advance this literature in several ways. First, we examine whether these differences are sensitive to the age at which migrants arrived at their destination and the time spent at destination. In particular, we address key empirical challenges related to the use of cross-sectional data and the composition of migrant cohorts,

²Hereafter, we use the terms political opinions, attitudes and preferences interchangeably, although we are aware that subtle differences may exist between these terminologies.

which have been largely overlooked in the existing scholarship. Second, the economic literature has largely neglected immigrants' attitudes toward migration policy and EU integration. Our findings offer new evidence in this area.

We also contribute to the literature examining the role of impressionable years in the formation of political preferences. Recent studies highlight that an individual's impressionable years between the age of 18 and 25 are crucial for shaping political attitudes toward redistribution (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014), immigration (Cotofan et al., 2022), or political trust (Aksoy et al., 2020). Consistent with this scholarship, our paper demonstrates that the assimilation of immigrants regarding immigration policy, European integration, and trust in political institutions is more pronounced for immigrants who arrived during those impressionable years.

Our paper also builds on the scientific work documenting the impact of cultural interactions with the host society on immigrants' assimilation. Bratsberg et al. (2021) and Andersson et al. (2022) find that the primary predictor of turnout among immigrants is the turnout of natives in the same neighborhood, indicating horizontal transmission of political culture. Achard (2022) reaches a similar conclusion for asylum seekers in the Netherlands, showing that cultural assimilation is slower for those growing up in ethnic enclaves. Our findings align with these studies, revealing a positive relationship between local political culture among natives and immigrants' views on migration policy and political trust, particularly among immigrants more exposed to their host environment.

Because the political assimilation of immigrants is influenced by their motivation to maintain cultural identity, this paper also relates to the issue of self-selection into assimilation.³ While we cannot directly test this mechanism, our results suggest the presence of self-selection in matters of gay rights and redistribution. This aligns with Röder and Lubbers (2016), who notes that migrants intending to settle at their destination hold views on homosexuality closer to those of natives. It is also consistent with (Giavazzi et al., 2019), who found that political opinions offering a direct transactional advantage, such as support for pro-redistribution policies or alignment with the dominant political party, are more likely to be adopted by foreign-born immigrants.

Moreover, this paper is connected to the body of research on the extension of the franchise to individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds. Gonnot (2022) and Hillman and Van Long (2022) examine the theoretical implications of cultural incompatibilities between immigrant and native voters for public spending. Empirical studies by Vernby (2013) and Chevalier et al. (2018) illustrate the positive impact of immigrant voters on the size and composition of public spending. Consistent with these findings, our results reveal that foreign-born immigrants generally exhibit more liberal preferences compared to natives. This also aligns with the research of Moriconi et al. (2022), which demonstrates that second-generation immigrants in Western Europe tend to exhibit a left-wing bias in their voting preferences, reflecting stronger inclinations toward internationalism and multiculturalism.

Finally, we complement the literature on vertical transmission and inherited culture as a driver of immigrants' political preferences regarding redistribution (Hammar, 2020; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011), gay rights (Röder and Spierings, 2022), and trust in political institutions (Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010). These studies

³Various theoretical models have been proposed to study minorities' acculturation, defined as the "culture change that results from continuous, first-hand contact between two distinct cultural groups." See Berry and Padilla (1980).

document a strong, positive, and persistent relationship between immigrants’ political preferences and the average preferences in their birth countries. We provide evidence that the average preferences among natives residing near immigrants are also a significant predictor of immigrants’ preferences on these three political issues.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework that informs our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data and discusses econometric concerns. Section 4 and 5 contain the analysis of differences in political attitudes between natives immigrants. Section 6 concludes.

2 Theoretical framework

The first part of our analysis offers a detailed examination of the differences in political attitudes between natives and immigrants, focusing on their exposure to the host society. Previous research has demonstrated that immigrants’ exposure to both their country of origin and their destination country significantly predicts variations in political attitudes compared to natives, particularly concerning redistribution, trust in political institutions, and gay rights (Algan et al., 2012; Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010; Röder and Lubbers, 2016; Soehl, 2017). Time spent in the destination country is often correlated with a substantial reduction in the opinion gap between first-generation immigrants and natives, which is frequently interpreted as evidence that immigrants assimilate to the political norms of the host society. First-generation immigrants who migrated at a young age are also more likely to adopt views similar to those of natives, as their limited exposure to the culture and institutions of their country of origin, coupled with greater interaction with natives through schooling and education, fosters political convergence. Given that their socialization process takes place entirely in the host country, such individuals are expected to exhibit fewer differences in political attitudes than those who migrated later in life. Accordingly, age at migration and time spent in the destination country should be associated with larger and smaller differences, respectively, in political attitudes between foreign-born immigrants and natives.⁴

Hypothesis 1 *Immigrants who were younger at the time of migration and spent more time at destination should display political attitudes that are closer to those of natives.*

The second part of our analysis delves into the role of culture. The general influence of culture on political preferences is well-established.⁵ However, in the context of the destination country, the political assimilation of immigrants is also shaped by institutional factors, such as their economic, political, and social rights, which influence opportunities for integration (Maxwell, 2010; Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010; Aleksynska, 2011; Helliwell et al., 2016; Dinesen, 2012).⁶ To disentangle the effects of acculturation, we leverage the idiosyncratic nature of cultural transmission. First, substantial evidence indicates that political preferences

⁴We acknowledge the limitations of cross-sectional data to study the effect of time spent at destination and discuss their implications in Section 4.2.

⁵Refer to (Hammar, 2020; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011) for redistribution, (Berggren et al., 2019; Röder and Spierings, 2022) for gay rights, (Curtice, 2016) for European integration, (Citrin et al., 1997; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014) for immigration policy, and (Inglehart, 2020; Putnam, 1993) for trust in political institutions)

⁶For example, first-generation migrants who have resided in the host society for several years and become eligible for citizenship may find it easier to assimilate politically, as civic engagement can promote involvement in political life. Conversely, when immigrants face greater barriers to political participation, they are more likely to retain political opinions aligned with their country of origin.

vary within countries, reflecting significant cultural, legal, and political differences.⁷ Second, cultural assimilation occurs primarily through contact between immigrants and natives (Andersson et al., 2022; Achard, 2022). Specifically, horizontal cultural transmission takes place through interactions, communication, and contact with native peers, who act as agents of assimilation. In this context, we anticipate that local culture will serve as a strong predictor of immigrants’ political preferences.

Hypothesis 2a *Local culture is a significant predictor of the political preferences of foreign-born immigrants*

By the same token, the influence of local culture should be stronger for immigrants that have been more exposed to it, either because they have spent more time at destination or because they migrated at a younger age.

Hypothesis 2b *Local culture is a stronger predictor of the political views of immigrants that have spent more time at destination and migrated to their destination country at a younger age.*

It is important to emphasize that, throughout this paper, assimilation is conceptualized as a unidirectional process in which immigrants are influenced by natives and gradually adopt their norms and beliefs. However, there is some evidence in the economic literature suggesting that the reverse might also occur, at least in the American context: over time, immigrants may impact their host society through cultural transmission from immigrants to natives (see Giuliano and Tabellini (2020)). While our data do not allow us to differentiate between these phenomena, we consider the native-to-immigrant influence to be more likely responsible for our findings, given the relative size of the two groups and recent literature indicating that although immigrants do contribute to cultural diffusion, this is often by exporting the host country’s culture back to their countries of origin (see Rapoport et al. (2020) and Duquette-Rury et al. (2018)).

3 Data and methodology

3.1 Data and Sample

We use six rounds of the European Social Survey (2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020). The ESS is a cross-country survey conducted biennially in 30 European countries, and provides information about the socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes of respondents. It also collects information on the migration status and background of foreign-born respondents, including their country of birth and the number of years spent at destination by individuals. We exclude from our sample Israel, a non-European country, as well Bulgaria and Poland for the lack of data on foreign-born, who represent less than 1% of the weighted sample surveyed in those countries. Estonia, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine are also excluded as migrants in these countries are very different from other European countries.⁸ The resulting sample is a balanced sample of economically integrated European democracies at a similar stage of economic development, plus some Central Eastern countries, who went through economic integration and democratisation

⁷A notable example of within-country variation is the reunification of Germany, which incorporated a large population from the former Soviet bloc with markedly different political preferences from West German natives. As a result, contemporary regional differences in support for redistribution between East and West Germans may be more pronounced than differences between natives and immigrants (Dancygier and Saunders, 2006).

⁸When looking at the composition of immigrants, 98 % of foreign-born individuals surveyed in these countries were born in the Soviet Union or in former Soviet states. The cultural similarity between natives and immigrants in these countries does not allow for a meaningful analysis.

quite recently: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The ESS surveys individuals of at least 15 years of age. We identify natives as respondents born in their country of residence with parents also born in the same country and second-generation immigrants as individuals born in their country of residence with at least one foreign-born parent. We refer to natives and second-generation immigrants together as native-born, or individuals born in their country of residence. First-generation immigrants, the main focus of our analysis, are defined as foreign-born individuals with both parents born outside of the host country. We choose to leave out immigrants born in a foreign country but with one or both parents born in their country of residence as members of this group are very likely to be influenced by their host country's political norms through vertical transmission.

We focus our attention on five political attitudes for which data is collected in all rounds of the European Social survey: redistribution, gay rights, European integration, immigration policy, and trust in political institutions. We use respondents' opinion to the following statement as a measure of attitudes toward redistribution: *"The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels"*, to which respondents are asked if they strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or disagree strongly. We re-code this question on an ascending 4-point scale in the following way: 0 from strongly disagree to 4 for strongly agree.⁹ Using an identical scale, the second variable captures political attitudes to gay rights through respondents' opinion about the following statement *"Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish"*. We use the same re-scaling method as for redistribution to construct the associated dependent variable. Third, we investigate attitudes toward European Union through respondents' position about greater unification of the EU from 0 - *"Unification already gone too far"* to 10 - *"Unification must go further"*. Fourth, we look at migrants' attitudes to immigration policy through respondents' opinion about the following statement on a 0-3 scale: *"To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here"*.¹⁰ Last, we study trust in political institutions using respondents' level of trust in their residence country's parliament, on a scale from 0 - *"No trust at all"* to 10 - *"Complete trust"*. Political variables are normalized between 0 to 1 for comparability.¹¹

This leads to an overall sample of 177,377 observations, of which 151,773 natives, 14,197 first-generation immigrants and 11,407 second generation immigrants. Detailed information and summary statistics are available in Table 1, 2 and 3. While it is worth noting that the ESS has not been designed to include or oversample immigrants, which might decrease the power of our general analysis, previous studies have shown that the ESS sampling method is reliable in reflecting the proportion of foreign-born and natives in

⁹While the 2008 and 2016 ESS rounds have specific modules on welfare preferences, we choose to use the only question capturing policy preferences for redistribution that is present in all rounds of the survey to maximize the number of first-generation immigrants in the sample.

¹⁰The ESS asks in every round several other questions about individuals' perception of the level of immigration, with mentions to migrants' relative economic position and place of origin. In practice, individual answers to these questions are strongly correlated, and we therefore choose the most neutral of these statements as the reference variable.

¹¹The correlation between the five policy items is relatively small: the highest pair-wise correlation among all 5 variables is equal to 0.27 for gay rights and immigration policy. See Table 12 in Appendix.

the population and the actual origin countries of immigrants (Castles et al., 2005).

3.2 Methodology

In the following analysis, we examine how differences and convergence in political attitudes with natives are influenced by immigrants’ exposure to the host society and the local culture at destination.

Our baseline model is the following:

$$Pref_{ijcr} = \alpha + \beta Immig_i + \delta X_i + \nu_j + \mu_{cr} + \epsilon_{ijcr} \quad (1)$$

where the dependent variable *Pref* is the political preference of individual *i* surveyed in destination region *j*, country *c* and ESS round *r*. The variable *Immig* is a categorical variable for whether the respondent is a native-born individual with both parents born in the residence country, a second generation immigrant with one or more parents born outside of the residence country, or a foreign-born immigrant. The coefficient β thus captures the corresponding migrant-to-native gap. We control in vector *X* for several individual socio-economic characteristics that matter for political preferences: gender, age, whether or not the respondent is married and has children, tertiary education, citizenship, whether the respondent lives in an urban area, the respondent’s assessment of his or her financial situation, the size of the respondent’s household, individual employment status, whether the host country’s language is spoken at home, the level of education and employment status of the respondent’s partner, whether the respondent has ever been unemployed for a period of more than 3 months.¹² We net out the effect of vertical transmission by controlling for respondents’ region of origin and religious affiliation. By the same token, we control for family background, captured by the respondent’s father level of education and employment status when the respondent was fourteen. We also include time-invariant regional fixed-effects to control for the role of location-specific factors that may affect the assimilation rate of immigrants and ensure the comparability across specifications throughout the paper.¹³ Finally, we include a full set of destination country-survey round fixed effects μ to control for time-varying country-specific factors (e.g. GDP per capita, unemployment, global macroeconomic conditions or immigration flows) that might influence political preferences or simply the way in which respondents answer the survey questions.

Before presenting the estimation results, we address some econometric concerns and endogeneity issues that may affect the validity and interpretation of our findings.

The first issue relates to the endogeneity between individual characteristics and political attitudes. Specifically, immigrants’ political preferences may directly influence, or be correlated with, omitted variables that affect individual factors such as marital status, financial and employment situations, religious affiliations, and other variables controlled for in our analysis. To ensure the robustness of our results, we systematically

¹²While being important in predicting political preferences, particularly with what regards redistribution, household income level is missing for almost one fifth of the sample. Instead, we control for employment status as well as respondents’ assessment of their financial situation.

¹³Regions are defined at the NUTS1 or NUTS2 level. See Table 10.

test our estimates against an alternative specification, employing a more concise set of exogenous control variables, restricted to age, gender, post-secondary education, region of origin, father’s occupation, and father’s education.

The second issue involves estimating the migrant-to-native gap simultaneously across several immigrant categories, which entails regressing multiple treatments on five different outcome variables. This increases the risk of bias due to multiple hypothesis testing. To address this concern, we compute Romano-Wolf stepdown adjusted p-values for each coefficient. Romano-Wolf p-values mitigate the risk of Type I errors in multiple hypothesis testing while preserving the ability to identify significant results.¹⁴

Third, the immigrants in our sample differ from natives across several individual characteristics (Table 3). In our empirical analysis, we control for these variables to mitigate concerns of omitted variable bias. To more effectively account for compositional differences, we construct a matched sample using the covariate matching methodology outlined by (Imbens and Rubin, 2015). This approach selects a control sub-sample that is more balanced in terms of covariates relative to the treated sample of first-generation immigrants. Specifically, we employ the Mahalanobis Metric Matching method, matching first-generation immigrants and natives by minimizing the distance between individuals across all observed covariates.¹⁵ As shown in Table 4, following the matching procedure, the distribution of covariates between natives and first-generation immigrants becomes more balanced. This matched sample is subsequently used to conduct robustness checks on our findings.

Fourth, we address concerns related to unobserved heterogeneity between natives and first-generation immigrants. Such heterogeneity could suggest that disparities in the distribution of covariates between these groups may not be fully captured by the control variables, potentially compromising the accuracy of our analysis and introducing bias in our estimates if selection occurs along unobservable characteristics. To mitigate this issue, we apply Oster (2019)’s method to assess the extent of selection on unobservables.¹⁶

4 The political assimilation of immigrants

4.1 Age at migration

Table A.1 presents the estimation results of model 1. The political preferences of second-generation immigrants closely align with those of natives, though they tend to show relatively greater support for immigration (see column 4). This result is in line with (Moriconi et al., 2022), who found that second-generation immigrants, when voting, exhibit a left-wing bias associated with stronger preferences for internationalism and multiculturalism. We also find that foreign-born immigrants hold significantly more *liberal* views than natives on average across all dependent variables but political trust. They show greater support for redistri-

¹⁴Romano-Wolf p-values in multiple hypothesis testing are designed to control the family-wise error rate (FWER), which is the probability of making one or more Type I errors (false positives) across all hypotheses being tested. The procedure involves bootstrap resampling to create a distribution of test statistics under the null hypothesis and then sequentially adjusts p-values starting from the smallest to ensure robust control over false positives. See McKenzie (2021).

¹⁵We express our appreciation to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

¹⁶Oster’s technique calculates the degree of selection on unobservables, denoted as δ , relative to observables, for which the estimated coefficient is equal to zero. A δ value greater than 1 in absolute terms is generally interpreted as evidence that the potential threat of selection on unobservables is minimized. A value of $\delta = 1$ implies that selection on unobservables is as influential as selection on observables in producing estimates equal to zero. A value near zero suggests that selection on unobservables has minimal impact compared to observed covariates, indicating a greater threat from unobservable selection.

bution, gay rights, European integration, and looser immigration policies.¹⁷ Consistent with the literature on religion and political preferences (Basten and Betz, 2013), the breakdown of these differences highlights significant disparities among immigrants based on their religious affiliations - see Table S.1 in Appendix. For instance, foreign-born, Muslim immigrants generally hold views that are more distant from those of natives compared to other foreign-born immigrants, especially regarding gay rights, where they exhibit consistently more conservative preferences.¹⁸

As outlined in Section 2, we anticipate that these attitudinal differences will vary depending on the age at which foreign-born immigrants migrated. In particular, immigrants who arrived at a young age did not make the decision to migrate and had limited exposure to the culture and institutions of their country of origin. Additionally, they benefited from greater interaction with the host society through schooling and education, making them more likely to be culturally similar to natives. Moreover, it is well-established that political opinions become less malleable after the impressionable years (Cotofan et al., 2022), (Aksoy et al., 2020), making immigrants who migrate in their late twenties or later less likely to adjust their political attitudes in response to the host society’s influence.

Table A.2 presents the results of model 1 where the variable *Immig* now differentiates between three groups: foreign-born immigrants who migrated before the age of 15 and were raised in the destination country, first-generation immigrants who arrived between the ages of 15 and 25 (during their impressionable years), and first-generation immigrants who migrated at age 25 or older. Descriptive statistics for each age group are provided in Tables 4, 5, and 6.

The observed gap in preferences toward redistribution between immigrants and natives appears to be driven primarily by individuals who migrated between the ages of 15 and 25. However, this difference is no longer significant when the analysis is conducted using a sample of immigrants and natives matched on covariates (Table S.4). These findings suggest that support for redistribution is generally comparable between native-born and foreign-born individuals, aligning with existing literature (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2015), (Schmidt-Catran and Careja, 2017), (Algan et al., 2012), and the theory proposed by (Giavazzi et al., 2019), which posits that attitudes conferring transactional advantages tend to converge across groups.

Additionally, we find that only immigrants who arrived before the age of 15 exhibit significantly more favorable views on gay rights compared to natives. The estimated effect is substantial, nearly double the size of the marginal effect of tertiary education (0.035). This difference remains robust across various model specifications (see Tables S.3, S.4, and S.5) and is unlikely to be influenced by selection on unobservable factors.¹⁹ A plausible explanation is that immigrants who migrated after the age of 15 selected their destination country based on gender and social norms, whereas those who grew up in the destination country simply followed their parents and were not able to make such choices.

Immigrants who migrated as adults (aged 15 and older) exhibit greater support for European integration compared to natives. The observed opinion gap — a 0.05 difference on a 0-1 scale — is comparable,

¹⁷Most individuals controls are significant, as shown in Table S.1.

¹⁸Although warranted, further analysis of the political preferences of immigrants across religious beliefs is not possible with the data at our disposal: Muslim immigrants represent only a small (19%) and unevenly distributed share of the foreign-born population in the sample. For a detailed study of the assimilation of Muslim immigrants, see Ng (2022), Kalmijn and Kraaykamp (2018), Soehl (2017).

¹⁹Oster’s δ is 1.87.

ceteris paribus, to the marginal effect of completing tertiary education. This disparity may reflect cultural divergence between natives and foreign-born individuals, a factor that has been shown to contribute to skepticism toward the European Union (Curtice, 2016). Furthermore, the likelihood that these coefficients are influenced by selection on unobservables is minimized, as Oster’s δ exceeds 1.²⁰ The result remains robust when alternative specifications with exogenous controls or a matched sample are used (see Tables S.3 and S.4).

Migrants also retain more positive views than natives about immigration, regardless of their age at migration. First-generation immigrants of different categories hold similar views on migration policy,²¹ with an estimated gap to natives equivalent to the marginal effect of holding tertiary education (0.07). This finding passes all our robustness tests and is consistent with the work of Šedovič and Dražanová (2023) that foreign-born immigrants’ attitudes toward immigration are mostly guided by intergroup solidarity, which decreases among second-generation immigrants born at destination. As the latter benefit from a much better integration into their host society, it is possible that they adopt a sense of national belonging and hence a more restrictive stance on migration than other immigrants (Pehrson et al., 2009).

Finally, first-generation immigrants who grew up at destination and those who migrated after the age of 25 show respectively lower and higher levels of trust in political institutions than natives. For the former, a possible explanation is that hostility toward the government stems from experienced discrimination, racism, or marginalization while growing up in the destination country (Tyrberg, 2024). This hostility may also be inherited from their parents through vertical transmission if the parents personally experienced discrimination (see Dinesen and Hooghe (2010)).²² We must stress, however, that this coefficient loses statistical significance and is substantially smaller in magnitude when restricting controls to exogenous characteristics (see Table S.3). As a result, we cannot rule out the possibility of an endogeneity bias.²³ The coefficient for immigrants who migrated aged 25 or older remains robust across specifications – although at risk of selection on unobservables -. This finding is consistent with the existing literature, which suggests that first-generation immigrants tend to be more optimistic about the government in their destination country, particularly when migration was a conscious choice (Maxwell, 2010; Bergh and Öhrvall, 2018).

Our findings reveal substantial differences in political opinions between foreign-born immigrants and observationally similar natives. However, these differences are influenced by the age at migration only in the context of attitudes toward EU integration and, to a lesser extent, political trust, offering limited support for hypothesis 1. In the next section, we examine whether the gap in political opinions between migrants and natives remains stable over time spent in the destination country.

4.2 Time since migration

We now turn to the role of time spent in the destination country, which we use as another proxy of exposure to the host society. Studying the evolution of immigrants’ political preferences with time since

²⁰This suggests that a greater degree of selection on unobservables than on observables would be required to render the estimated coefficient insignificant.

²¹The t-test for the difference between coefficients is not significant across the different categories of foreign-born immigrants

²²For evidence that immigrants update their belief about the government at destination, see Helliwell et al. (2016)

²³For example, political trust is known to be linked to economic performance, as discussed by Algan and Cahuc (2010).

migration - or hereafter, tenure - ideally requires panel data, which allow to track individuals over time. However, the data used in this study are drawn from a repeated cross-sectional survey, which presents three distinct challenges for identification.

First, existing research on the cultural assimilation of immigrants in the U.S. context has demonstrated that political opinions of immigrants, as well as the conditions in their destination countries at the time of migration, tend to vary significantly across immigrant cohorts (Abramitzky et al. (2016), Borjas (2017), Docquier et al. (2020)). Consequently, any claims about the relationship between political preferences and time since migration must account for this cohort-specific instability. In our sample, which covers the period from 2010 to 2020, time since migration is highly correlated with the arrival cohort, particularly for immigrants who have been in the host country for an extended period. This correlation poses a challenge in disentangling the effects of time since migration from those associated with the cohort of arrival, particularly for individuals who migrated many years ago. To address this issue, we limit the sample of foreign-born immigrants to those who migrated after 1991 and were surveyed within 30 years of arriving in their destination country. While this approach excludes a substantial portion of first-generation immigrants and thus limits the scope of our analysis — particularly with respect to long-term assimilation —, it helps mitigate the correlated regressor problem while ensuring an adequate number of observations. We categorize three historically consistent decades as arrival cohorts for Western European immigrants: the post-EU integration period following the Maastricht Treaty (1991–2001), the EU enlargement phase (2002–2009), and the period following the Global Financial Crisis (2010–2022).

Second, the preferences of first-generation immigrants who grew up in their country of residence presents a challenge, as the ESS survey includes only respondents aged 15 and older. This leads to an over-representation of such immigrants among those with longer tenure.²⁴ As a result, the interpretation of the tenure effect may be affected by a compositional bias, as migrants educated in the destination country systematically have longer tenure. To address this, we exclude immigrants who migrated before the age of 15 from subsequent analyses. The final sample includes 7,504 foreign-born immigrants — with detailed information provided in Tables 7, 8, and 9.

A final concern relates to the issue of return migration, which may introduce sample selection bias if return migration is influenced by characteristics that directly or indirectly shape political preferences.²⁵ Immigrants with longer tenure may systematically differ from those with shorter stays in the host country. To address this potential bias, we re-examine our results on a subsample of foreign-born immigrants who are less likely to return to their country of origin. Given that they differ from other foreign-born individuals along various dimensions — including the transferability of their skills and the likelihood of integration — we restrict the sample by excluding EU citizens and individuals who migrated to countries less than 1,500 km from their country of birth, for whom the costs associated with return migration are generally lower.^{26 27}

²⁴For example, in the full sample, 60% of migrants were surveyed 10 years or more after their arrival, compared to 86% among first-generation migrants who migrated before age 15.

²⁵For example, according to a 2008 OECD report, depending on the country and time period, 20% to 50% of immigrants leave their host country within five years of arrival. The implications of out-migration in cross-sectional data analysis are discussed at length in Abramitzky et al. (2016).

²⁶For instance, in Norway, while the average return rate after five years is about 50%, the retention rate for immigrants from OECD countries is below 30%, whereas it exceeds 75% for non-Western immigrants (Bratsberg et al., 2007). Similarly, in Sweden, immigrants from Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe have lower probabilities of leaving the country (Nekby, 2006)

²⁷We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

In light of the above considerations, we estimate the following model:

$$Pref_{icr} = \alpha + \beta ysm_i + \gamma_k Cohort_k + \delta X_i + \nu_j + \mu_{cr} + \epsilon_{ijcr} \quad (2)$$

Model 2 is analogous to Model 1, but substitutes the *Immig* variable with *ysm*, which represents the number of years since migration. Additionally, *Cohort* comprises a set of dummy variables for each arrival cohort k , with native-born individuals (natives and second-generation immigrants) serving as the reference group. γ_k therefore captures the estimated gap between natives and immigrants from cohort k at the time of migration, while *ysm* returns the marginal effect of an additional year since migration on the magnitude of this gap.

The results of model 2 are presented in Table A.3. For each policy variable, the first column reports the coefficients β and γ . The second column provides a test of cohort-specific coefficients for time since migration β_k , estimated by augmenting (2) with an interaction term between the *ysm* and *Cohort* variables.

Our findings indicate that immigrants' views on redistribution and gay rights do not significantly differ from those of native-born individuals, both at the time of arrival and over time since migration.²⁸ Hypothesis 1 is therefore rejected for both variables, in line with the conclusion of section 4.1. These results contrast with previous studies (Röder, 2015) on gay rights, which found that immigrants with longer tenure exhibit attitudes more similar to those of native-born individuals. This discrepancy can be explained by the exclusion of immigrants who migrated before the age of 15, as well as the addition of cohort fixed effects in the present study.

In contrast, we observe that immigrants are more supportive of European integration and immigration policy than natives, and exhibit higher levels of trust in political institutions at the time of migration. Immigrants' political views at migration are estimated to be approximately 0.05 points higher on EU integration and political trust compared to native-born individuals, and between 0.11 and 0.14 points higher on immigration policy. For European integration, differences in opinions upon arrival are only significant for the later cohorts (between 0.06 and 0.07 points on a 0-1 scale - see column 5).²⁹ This may reflect the relatively recent emergence of the European Union project compared to other political attitudes, which could explain why immigrants who migrated before the EU enlargement phase in the 2000s initially held views similar to those of native-born respondents upon arrival.

The coefficient for years since migration is only significant, however, for immigration policy. Estimates from column 7 imply that migrants become less supportive of migration policies than the native-born community as they stay longer in the host country. An additional 10 years in the host country are associated, ceteris paribus, with a reduction in the migrant-to-native gap by 0.04 points.³⁰ Using column (8), we can compute the gap between native-born individuals and immigrants who migrated between 2002 and 2009

²⁸This is consistent with the conclusions in Section 4.1 on the political attitudes of immigrants who were 15 or older at the time of migration.

²⁹The t-test for the difference between coefficients is significant at the 5% level.

³⁰The negative coefficient is interpreted as a reduction in differences since the native-to-migrant opinion gap at the time of migration is positive, as indicated by the cohort estimates.

and have lived 15 years at destination as follows: $\gamma_{2002,2009} + 15 \times \beta_{2002,2009} = 0.124 - 15 \times 0.0041 = .0635$. By the same token, depending on the arrival cohort of immigrants, it takes between 20 and 28 years for immigrants' views on immigration policy to align with those of native-born individuals, i.e for the migrant-to-native gap to lose statistical significance at the conventional level (p-value > 0.1). This convergence pattern can be interpreted as a "club" effect, whereby immigrants become more favourable to closing the door on immigration over time, in line with Šedovič and Dražanová (2023).

Building on the previous discussion regarding formative years, we expect the preferences of an immigrant who migrated at age 30 to be less sensitive to tenure compared to an immigrant who spent their formative years in the destination country. Table A.4 reports the estimated migrant-to-native gap at the time of migration as well as the tenure coefficient β for immigrants aged 15-25 and those older than 25 at migration.³¹ For immigration policy, the tenure coefficient is twice as large for the cohort of immigrants who migrated during their formative years (Column 4). This difference is significant at the 1% level. Additionally, the coefficient for years since migration is now significant for trust in political institutions among immigrants who migrated between the ages of 15 and 25. Following the same reasoning as previously applied, the opinion gap between these immigrants and native-born respondents becomes insignificant after 12 years.

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, time spent in the destination country is associated with smaller differences in political opinions on immigration policy and trust in political institutions. Further, these results indicate that the age at which immigrants arrive significantly influences their political assimilation. These findings are robust to potential selection bias, as evidenced by Oster's delta exceeding 1 in absolute value (Table A.4). Moreover, they remain stable across various alternative specifications, including those with exogenous controls (Table S.7), a matched sample (Table S.8), and a sample restricted to immigrants less likely to return to their country of origin (Table S.12).

Overall, our analysis reveals a pattern of political assimilation consistent with the influence of cultural transmission: immigrants' exposure to the host society, as measured by age at migration and time spent in the destination country, is associated with greater convergence toward natives' preferences. However, this relationship is evident in attitudes toward EU integration, migration policy, and trust in political institutions, but not in attitudes toward redistribution and gay rights. As noted earlier, self-selection may affect these outcomes, as immigrants, regardless of their age, may hold political views similar to those of natives in places where they choose to emigrate. Additionally, unobservable factors such as ethnic networks and institutions, which are not directly associated to age at migration or time spent in the destination country, may shape political attitudes independently and thereby constrain the extent to which exposure alone can explain the convergence of immigrants' views with those of natives.

In the next section, we conduct a subnational analysis aimed at isolating the cultural dimension of political attitudes at the local level. While self-selection cannot be eliminated, this approach allows us to mitigate the impact of institutional and country-level factors that may confound the relationship between

³¹These coefficients are estimated by enhancing Model 2 with an interaction term between years since migration and age at migration. More specifically, we estimate the following model: $Pref_{icr} = \alpha + \beta_{ysm_i} \times Ageatmigration_i + Ageatmigration_i + \gamma_k Cohort_k + \delta X_i + \mu_{cr} + \epsilon_{icr}$.

political attitudes and local cultural influences.

5 Local culture

This section investigates the role of cultural transmission in the political assimilation of immigrants by analyzing the convergence of political preferences between immigrants and natives within the same sub-national community.

5.2 Regional analysis

We first examine the correlation between the political preferences of immigrants and natives living in the same region. Following [Tabellini \(2010\)](#), we propose that institutions influence political outcomes at the country level, while cultural influences operate at the regional level. Consequently, when time-varying, country-level confounders are accounted for, the correlation between immigrants' preferences and regional norms would indicate the degree of cultural assimilation of immigrants in political matters.

Regions are defined at the NUTS1 or NUTS2 level. For each of the five dependent variables, regional culture is computed as the average political preferences of native-born respondents across survey rounds, weighted by sample survey weights. A potential issue with using NUTS regions is their lack of representativeness, given that the European Social Survey (ESS) is primarily designed to offer a representative sample at the country level. To mitigate this concern, we aggregate respondents from NUTS2 regions into the NUTS1 level when necessary, based on the ESS assessment of socio-demographic sample composition by [Koch and Briceno-Rosas \(2021\)](#), as well as other published works using regional ESS data (e.g., [Piper \(2015\)](#)). We also exclude four countries for which the ESS does not provide sub-national geographical information: Cyprus, Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal.³² Additionally, due to the small number of foreign-born individuals surveyed in some regions, we omit regions where foreign-born individuals constitute less than 1% of the weighted population sample and those where fewer than 15 foreign-born migrants were surveyed by the ESS. A detailed list of the 120 regions included in the analysis is provided in Table 10.³³ Figure 1 compares the proportion of first-generation immigrants in the ESS data with the proportion of foreign-born immigrants from the OECD database at the regional level, showing a strong correlation between the two measures.

To assess the extent to which regional culture predicts immigrants' political views, we re-estimate Model 1 on the sample of foreign-born individuals:

$$Pref_{ijcr} = \alpha + \beta Culture_j + \gamma Z_j + \delta X_i + \mu_{cr} + \epsilon_{ijcr} \quad (3)$$

where the immigration dummy has been dropped and time-invariant regional fixed effects replaced with region-specific variables that are expected to influence individual political preferences. The *Culture* variable

³²Including these four countries as regions in the analysis does not alter the results either quantitatively or qualitatively.

³³As can be seen in Table 11, within-country regional variation in political preferences accounts for 20%-50% of the variation observed between regions.

captures regional culture as defined above. The vector of regional characteristics Z includes the logarithm of the total population, the unemployment rate, the logarithm of GDP per capita, the crude rate of net migration, and the share of the foreign-born population. These variables have been found to influence preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011), anti-immigration and nationalistic sentiment (Moriconi et al., 2019), and trust in political institutions (Algan et al., 2017).³⁴

Table A.5 presents the results of Model 3. For each dependent variable, the first and second columns report the β coefficients estimated for Model 3, with and without regional controls Z , respectively. The political attitudes of immigrants concerning redistribution, immigration policy, and trust in political institutions are significantly predicted by regional culture, in support of Hypothesis 2a. The regional control variables generally exhibit limited significance and small effect sizes. This may be attributable to the averaging of macroeconomic variables over several years, which mitigates short- and medium-term fluctuations, whereas attitudinal variables are typically more stable and less prone to variation over the period of interest. Additionally, factors influencing the general native population at the regional level may not necessarily impact immigrants in the same manner. An exception is the variable related to GDP per capita and preferences for redistribution, but the effect is small and largely overshadowed by the influence of regional culture (the F-statistic of the test in difference is 7.5).

Consistent with our previous analysis in Section 4, we examine how the predictive power of local culture varies with immigrants' tenure and age at migration. Table A.6 presents the results of Model 3, incorporating interactions between regional culture and indicators for immigrants' tenure or age at migration. The partial correlation between regional culture and immigrants' political attitudes on immigration policy and trust in political institutions is significantly stronger for those with longer tenure.³⁵ Regional culture also serves as a more robust predictor of trust in political institutions for immigrants who migrated at a younger age. These findings corroborate hypothesis 2b: The relationship between local culture and political preferences is stronger among foreign-born individuals who have been more exposed to their host environment. The coefficients for EU integration reflect a similar pattern, although less consistently: regional culture significantly predicts attitudes toward EU integration among immigrants who have resided in the destination for at least 18 years. Conversely, regional culture is a better predictor of support for redistribution among immigrants who spent less than 18 years in the destination country, with no significant difference observed between immigrants who migrated before or after the age of 25. We find no significant association of local culture with immigrants' attitudes toward gay rights and observe no variation in the coefficients across different immigrant categories.

³⁴All data are sourced from the ESS multilevel database—accessed on May 1, 2023—averaged over the analysis period, and rescaled between 0 and 1 where necessary for comparability.

³⁵It is important to note that linking immigrants to their region of residence at the time of the survey may present challenges for those with longer tenure, as we cannot account for past mobility and cannot control for the possibility that some immigrants may have lived in different regions of their destination country. However, under reasonable assumptions, this would likely result in a downward bias of the estimated coefficients. Indeed, if anything, migrants who had moved between regions would have been less exposed to the political preferences of natives in their current region, potentially reducing the observed predictive power.

5.2 Peer community

As an alternative test of the influence of local culture, we examine whether immigrants’ political attitudes are influenced by those of their native-born peers with whom they are most likely to interact at the regional level.

The ESS provides data to identify native peers of immigrants based on geographic and socio-demographic characteristics. Building on the approach by Senik (2021), we select a set of characteristics to define reference groups of native-born peers. We assume that immigrants primarily interact with individuals residing in the same area who are similar in age and employment status.³⁶ To construct peer groups, we consider the NUTS region where respondents live, their type of dwelling (e.g., large cities and suburbs, medium-sized and small cities, or rural areas), their age (15-30, 30-50, 50-65, over 65), and their employment status (employed or not).³⁷ An immigrant’s peer group is thus defined as the cluster of native-born individuals residing in the same NUTS region, living in the same type of dwelling, and falling within the same age bracket and employment status. Using this method, a total of 2,775 peer groups are analyzed in the following sections.

We estimate the following model:

$$Pref_{ijcrp} = \alpha + \beta Culture_{jp} + \delta X_i + \nu_j + \mu_{cr} + \phi_p + \epsilon_{ijcrp} \quad (4)$$

where the preferences $Culture_{jp}$ of native peer group jp is defined as the weighted average of political attitudes among native-born respondents. In isolating the impact of cultural transmission between native-born communities and immigrants within regions, a key challenge is accurately capturing peer effects while accounting for regional clustering, or the influence of regional factors on political preferences. This issue is critical given that regional culture has been identified previously as a significant predictor of political attitudes. To address this, we incorporate region fixed effects ν_j , ensuring that our findings are not attributable to variations in regional characteristics and preferences. However, attributing our estimates to ”peer effects” also necessitates that β does not reflect the influence of the individual characteristics used to define peer groups. Therefore, we control for the potential overlap in political preferences among individuals within the same dwelling type, age bracket, and employment status by including group fixed effects ϕ_p . The full set of individual controls and destination country-survey round fixed effects are also included. The model is estimated on the same sample of foreign-born immigrants as Model 3, with standard errors clustered at the peer group level.

Results are presented in Table A.7. For each political variable, Panel A contains the peer-effect coefficients estimated in Model 4. Following the same logic as in the regional analysis, we report in panels B and C separate peer-effect coefficients based on the interaction between peer groups’ preferences and a dummy variable for immigrants’ tenure and age at migration.

³⁶Given that these variables are selected somewhat arbitrarily, we acknowledge some degree of imprecision in the subsequent analysis.

³⁷Further details on the construction of peer groups can be found in the Appendix.

For immigration policy and trust in political institutions, the correlation between peer preferences and immigrants' political views is significantly stronger among those who migrated at a younger age and have spent more time in the destination country. This provides support for hypotheses 2a and 2b, and is consistent with established theories suggesting that trust in political institutions has deep cultural roots (Inglehart (2020); Putnam (1993)).

In contrast, the partial correlation between the preferences of immigrants and their native peers does not exhibit any significant variation with respect to immigrants' tenure or age at migration for redistribution and gay rights. The convergence in views between immigrants and natives therefore corroborate hypothesis 2a but fails to support hypothesis 2b, indicating that the alignment of views between natives and immigrants on these issues is unlikely to be driven by acculturation over time. However, the significant association between immigrants' and natives' preferences in both areas is consistent with the existing literature on self-selection and endogenous assimilation.

The coefficient for attitudes toward gay rights remains significant regardless of the extent of immigrants' exposure to the host society. This finding aligns with the work of Röder and Lubbers (2016) and Docquier et al. (2020), who demonstrate that individuals who emigrate and settle in high-income countries tend to exhibit lower levels of religiosity and hold views on gender equality and homosexuality that are often closer to those of the native population in their destination country. It is therefore plausible that the alignment of views between natives and immigrants on matters of gay rights results from the self-selection of immigrants who move to regions and interact with native-born individuals who share similar perspectives.

Regarding redistribution, our findings are consistent with the theory that immigrants rapidly adapt to the political environment of their host country on matters that offer direct transactional benefits (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Giavazzi et al., 2019), reflecting a pattern of assimilation that does not align with a gradual process of acculturation.

6 Conclusion

As the proportion of immigrants continues to grow in developed countries, their influence on the political landscape of host communities becomes increasingly significant. This paper, utilizing survey data collected across 23 European countries from 2010 to 2020, investigates differences between foreign-born immigrants' and natives' attitudes on five politically salient issues. It contributes to a deeper understanding of immigrants' preferences on these topics.

Our analysis reveals that foreign-born immigrants display levels of trust in political institutions similar to those of observationally comparable natives. However, immigrants tend to express more favorable attitudes toward redistribution, gay rights, European integration, and immigration. Differences in attitudes toward EU integration and trust in political institutions are somewhat smaller for immigrants who migrated at a younger age. Moreover, the gap in attitudes regarding immigration policy and trust in political institutions narrows over time for immigrants who migrated between the ages of 15 and 25. In the second part of the paper, we document a significant convergence between local culture and the political preferences of first-generation immigrants, with this convergence being more pronounced among those with greater exposure

to the host environment. In the areas of immigration policy and trust in political institutions, the convergence is notably stronger for foreign-born individuals who migrated at a younger age and spent more time in the host country, suggesting a process of acculturation resulting from continuous, direct interaction between distinct cultural groups.³⁸ A similar pattern is found for attitudes toward EU integration, though only when community preferences are defined at the regional level. In contrast, the convergence in views on redistribution and gay rights does not depend on age at migration or the amount of time spent in the destination country. Although the underlying factors driving this assimilation remain unclear, these findings are consistent with the relevant literature on the self-selection of immigrants along cultural traits and the process of endogenous assimilation in host societies.

By documenting the political assimilation of immigrants and highlighting the role of cultural transmission, this paper contributes to the ongoing policy debate surrounding the integration of foreign-born individuals. It also sheds light on the potential electoral and political implications of immigrants' naturalization and enfranchisement.³⁹ While much of the existing literature focuses on the assimilation of immigrants to European political norms, an equally important question is whether immigrants, by importing the culture and values of their countries of origin, influence native political attitudes. The works of [Rapoport et al. \(2020\)](#) and [Giuliano and Tabellini \(2020\)](#), which demonstrate the lasting impact of immigration on American ideology through cultural transmission during the New Deal era, offer some insights into this question. This paper does not address this issue within the European context, which remains a critical avenue for future research.

³⁸While this analysis suggests the presence of cultural transmission, it is important to note that such transmission may occur through multiple channels, such as explicit attitudes or observed behavior. Further research is needed to disentangle these mechanisms.

³⁹It is important to recognize that immigrants' political participation is shaped by citizenship policies, which influence the size and composition of the foreign-born population eligible to vote. Several European countries, including Spain, Switzerland, and Belgium, have recently extended voting rights to non-citizen residents in local elections.

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7 Tables and Figures

7.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 1: Population in destination country

Country	ESS sample								OECD
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	ESS rounds	Natives	First-Gen	Second-Gen	Total	% natives	% first-gen	% second-gen	% first-gen
Austria	3	4,777	597	495	5,869	79.00	11.80	9.19	15.33
Belgium	6	6,887	1,153	914	8,954	76.95	12.90	10.13	13.64
Croatia	3	3,611	409	444	4,464	80.03	9.24	10.56	-
Cyprus	3	2,565	204	66	2,835	90.50	7.02	2.44	-
Czech Republic	6	11,305	245	795	12,345	91.63	1.89	6.35	-
Denmark	4	5,240	345	317	5,902	88.79	5.85	5.36	7.61
Finland	5	8,407	229	158	8,794	95.64	2.53	1.82	4.42
France	6	7,560	968	1,110	9,638	78.39	9.98	11.62	11.52
Germany	5	10,053	1,135	1,097	12,285	80.08	10.32	9.59	13.33
Greece	2	4,764	216	192	5,172	92.02	4.39	3.58	11.82
Hungary	5	7,501	89	189	7,779	96.35	3.21	2.41	4.04
Iceland	4	2,837	142	137	3,116	91.04	9.54	4.36	10.34
Ireland	6	10,151	1,486	549	12,186	82.06	12.78	5.13	13.99
Italy	4	7,129	406	164	7,699	92.40	8.32	2.20	9.30
Netherlands	6	7,696	618	619	8,933	86.16	10.82	7.02	11.20
Norway	6	7,045	524	402	7,971	87.97	8.68	5.10	10.77
Portugal	6	7,724	431	223	8,378	92.09	7.02	2.89	8.07
Slovakia	4	5,243	68	224	5,535	94.79	1.15	3.98	3.00
Slovenia	6	5,802	571	630	7,003	82.69	8.16	9.02	11.44
Spain	5	7,464	768	169	8,401	88.79	9.14	2.06	11.05
Sweden	5	5,852	738	567	7,157	81.78	11.28	7.92	14.34
Switzerland	6	5,063	1,979	1,226	8,268	61.15	23.99	14.82	25.69
United Kingdom	6	7,097	876	720	8,693	79.94	11.52	8.54	10.82
Observations	-	151,773	14,197	11,407	177,377	-	-	-	-

Notes: Column (1) reports the number of available rounds for a given country, while column (2) to (5) report the number of observations for, respectively, natives with both parents born in their residence country, first-generation immigrants, second-generation immigrants and the entire sample. First-generation immigrants are foreign-born individuals with both parents born outside of the host country; second generation immigrants are individuals born in their country of residence but with at least one foreign-born parent. In columns (6) to (8) provides corresponding information in relative shares, computed using survey design and population weights. Column (9) reports the average share of immigrants in a given country for the period 2010-2019 according to the OECD database.

Table 2: First-generation immigrants - Destination countries and survey rounds

Country	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018	2020	Total
Austria	0	0	183	176	238	0	597
Belgium	153	215	179	211	221	174	1,153
Croatia	124	0	0	0	141	144	409
Cyprus	54	94	0	0	56	0	204
Czech Republic	37	37	37	43	42	49	245
Denmark	81	93	96	0	75	0	345
Finland	0	65	74	31	24	35	229
France	127	166	164	154	186	171	968
Germany	228	203	249	223	232	0	1,135
Greece	216	0	0	0	0	0	216
Hungary	33	13	0	15	11	17	89
Iceland	0	25	0	38	40	39	142
Ireland	284	271	203	233	256	239	1,486
Italy	0	44	0	116	150	96	406
Netherlands	103	108	130	90	118	69	618
Norway	112	87	76	18	117	114	524
Portugal	78	63	44	46	83	117	431
Slovakia	26	20	0	0	12	10	68
Slovenia	78	84	77	105	127	100	571
Spain	154	171	128	161	154	0	768
Sweden	127	155	189	130	137	0	738
Switzerland	297	285	342	362	342	351	1,979
United Kingdom	168	180	121	106	203	98	876
Observations	2,480	2,379	2,292	2,258	2,965	1,823	14,197

Notes: Foreign-born respondents in the full sample across destination countries and survey-rounds. First-generation immigrants are defined as foreign-born individuals with both parents born outside of the host country.

Table 3: Full sample - Descriptives

Variable	Natives		First-gen		Second-gen	
	Mean	St. Dev	Mean	St. Dev	Mean	St. Dev
<i>Panel A: Individual level characteristics</i>						
Age	50.51	18.45	45.28	16.13	43.99	18.54
Male	0.48	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.48	0.50
Married	0.51	0.50	0.57	0.49	0.42	0.49
At least one child	0.57	0.49	0.53	0.50	0.48	0.50
Employed	0.53	0.50	0.58	0.49	0.55	0.50
Unemployed for at least 3 months	0.25	0.44	0.37	0.48	0.30	0.46
Tertiary education	0.35	0.48	0.42	0.49	0.39	0.49
Partner tertiary education	0.18	0.38	0.23	0.42	0.19	0.39
Father employed	0.93	0.26	0.88	0.32	0.90	0.30
Father tertiary education	0.15	0.36	0.24	0.42	0.23	0.42
Feeling about hh income	1.89	0.84	2.01	0.89	1.84	0.83
Rural area	0.71	0.45	0.58	0.49	0.63	0.48
Speaks language of destination	0.98	0.14	0.58	0.49	0.92	0.27
Citizenship	1.00	0.05	0.49	0.50	0.96	0.20
No religion	0.44	0.50	0.33	0.47	0.44	0.50
Christian	0.54	0.50	0.37	0.48	0.40	0.49
Muslim	0.01	0.03	0.19	0.36	0.12	0.32
Other religion	0.01	0.12	0.10	0.30	0.04	0.19
<i>Panel B: Political attitudes*</i>						
Redistribution	0.72	0.26	0.70	0.26	0.70	0.26
Gay rights	0.80	0.26	0.72	0.30	0.82	0.26
EU integration	0.50	0.26	0.55	0.27	0.52	0.26
Immigration policy	0.63	0.29	0.70	0.25	0.67	0.27
Political trust	0.45	0.26	0.53	0.26	0.47	0.26
Observations	151,773	151,773	14,197	14,197	11,407	11,407

*The difference in means between natives and immigrants and across immigrants' generation is significant at the 5 % level for all five political preferences. Authors' computation using survey weights.

Notes: Panel A reports the mean for individual controls, while Panel B reports the average score of the five political issues used as dependent variables.

Table 4: Full and matched sample - Descriptive statistics

Variable	Full sample				Matched sample			
	Natives		First-gen		Natives		First-gen	
	Mean	St. Dev	Mean	St. Dev	Mean	St. Dev	Mean	St. Dev
Age	50.51	18.45	45.28	16.13	43.12	17.24	45.33	16.10
Male	0.48	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.47	0.50
Married	0.51	0.50	0.57	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.57	0.49
At least one child	0.57	0.49	0.53	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.54	0.50
Employed	0.53	0.50	0.58	0.49	0.60	0.49	0.58	0.49
Unemploy. > 3 months	0.25	0.44	0.37	0.48	0.33	0.47	0.37	0.48
Tertiary education	0.35	0.48	0.42	0.49	0.36	0.48	0.42	0.49
Partner tertiary ed.	0.18	0.38	0.23	0.42	0.18	0.39	0.23	0.42
Father employed	0.93	0.26	0.88	0.32	0.89	0.31	0.88	0.32
Father tertiary ed.	0.15	0.36	0.24	0.42	0.19	0.39	0.24	0.42
Feeling hh income	1.89	0.84	2.01	0.89	1.94	0.79	2.01	0.89
Rural area	0.71	0.45	0.58	0.49	0.61	0.49	0.58	0.49
Speaks dest. lang.	0.98	0.14	0.58	0.49	0.58	0.49	0.58	0.49
Citizenship	1.00	0.05	0.49	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.49	0.50
No religion	0.44	0.50	0.33	0.47	0.33	0.47	0.36	0.48
Christian	0.54	0.50	0.37	0.48	0.47	0.50	0.45	0.50
Muslim	0.01	0.03	0.19	0.36	0.16	0.36	0.16	0.36
Other religion	0.01	0.12	0.10	0.30	0.04	0.19	0.04	0.19
Observations	151,773	151,773	14,197	14,197	6,459	6,459	14,010	14,010

Notes: The table includes all covariates used to match second-generation immigrants and natives using the Mahalanobis Metric Matching method. Regions of origin are excluded for obvious reasons as all natives were born in Western Europe. The mean standardized bias across covariates drops from 29 % in the full sample to 5.7 % in the matched sample.

Table 5: First-generation immigrants - Age at migration

Country of survey	Under 15	15-25	Above 25	Total	% Under 15	% 15-25	% Above 25
Austria	151	228	218	597	25.29	38.19	36.52
Belgium	309	357	487	1,153	26.80	30.96	42.24
Croatia	139	133	137	409	33.99	32.52	33.50
Cyprus	32	81	91	204	15.69	39.71	44.61
Czech Republic	84	95	66	245	34.29	38.78	26.94
Denmark	85	112	148	345	24.64	32.46	42.90
Finland	58	65	106	229	25.33	28.38	46.29
France	325	348	295	968	33.57	35.95	30.48
Germany	380	378	377	1,135	33.48	33.30	33.22
Greece	40	92	84	216	18.52	42.59	38.89
Hungary	23	28	38	89	25.84	31.46	42.70
Iceland	47	39	56	142	33.10	27.46	39.44
Ireland	222	497	767	1,486	14.94	33.45	51.62
Italy	105	139	162	406	25.86	34.24	39.90
Netherlands	209	199	210	618	33.82	32.20	33.98
Norway	121	165	238	524	23.09	31.49	45.42
Portugal	98	127	206	431	22.74	29.47	47.80
Slovakia	33	23	12	68	48.53	33.82	17.65
Slovenia	150	290	131	571	26.27	50.79	22.94
Spain	120	245	403	768	15.62	31.90	52.47
Sweden	199	256	283	738	26.96	34.69	38.35
Switzerland	450	726	803	1,979	22.74	36.69	40.58
United Kingdom	147	394	335	876	16.78	44.98	38.24
Total	3,527	5,017	5,653	14,197	24.84	35.34	39.82

Notes: Foreign-born respondents in the full sample across age at migration. First-generation immigrants are defined as foreign-born individuals with both parents born outside of the host country.

Table 6: First-generation immigrants - Descriptive statistics - Age at migration

Variable	Younger than 15		Age 15 - 25		Older than 25	
	Mean	St. Dev	Mean	St. Dev	Mean	St. Dev
<i>Panel A: Individual level characteristics</i>						
Age	40.29	17.87	43.87	16.46	49.66	13.31
Male	0.48	0.50	0.45	0.50	0.48	0.50
Married	0.43	0.50	0.58	0.49	0.65	0.48
At least one child	0.44	0.50	0.54	0.50	0.59	0.49
Employed	0.54	0.50	0.58	0.49	0.61	0.49
Unemployed for at least 3 months	0.34	0.48	0.36	0.48	0.39	0.49
Tertiary education	0.33	0.47	0.39	0.49	0.50	0.50
Partner tertiary education	0.16	0.36	0.21	0.41	0.29	0.46
Father employed	0.87	0.33	0.88	0.32	0.89	0.31
Father tertiary education	0.23	0.42	0.23	0.42	0.25	0.43
Feeling about hh income	1.92	0.85	2.05	0.88	2.03	0.91
Rural area	0.60	0.49	0.57	0.50	0.58	0.49
Speaks language of destination	0.74	0.44	0.57	0.49	0.50	0.50
Citizenship	0.72	0.45	0.48	0.50	0.36	0.48
Christian	0.17	0.37	0.17	0.38	0.13	0.34
Muslim	0.03	0.17	0.03	0.18	0.04	0.21
Others	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Years since migration	33.31	18.74	22.74	16.74	15.08	11.80
<i>Panel B: Political attitudes</i>						
Redistribution	0.70	0.26	0.72	0.25	0.69	0.26
LGBT rights	0.76	0.28	0.71	0.30	0.71	0.30
EU integration	0.52	0.27	0.55	0.27	0.57	0.27
Immigration policy	0.70	0.25	0.69	0.25	0.70	0.25
Political trust	0.49	0.26	0.52	0.26	0.56	0.25
Observations	3,527	3,527	5,017	5,017	5,653	5,653

Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for foreign-born immigrants across cohorts of arrival. The sample of reference is the restricted sample used in section 4.2 and excludes immigrants who migrated aged 15 or younger and those who migrated to their destination country before 1991. Panel A reports the mean and standard deviation for individual controls, while Panel B reports the average score and standard deviation of the five political issues used as dependent variables. Figures computed by the authors using survey weights.

Table 7: First-generation immigrants - Cohort of arrival

Country	1992-2001	2002-2009	2010-2022	Total	91-01, %	02-09, %	10-22, %
Austria	118	94	90	302	39.07	31.13	29.80
Belgium	212	269	167	648	32.72	41.51	25.77
Croatia	104	14	7	125	83.20	11.20	5.60
Cyprus	52	72	29	153	33.99	47.06	18.95
Czech Republic	45	19	25	89	50.56	21.35	28.09
Denmark	74	51	34	159	46.54	32.08	21.38
Finland	47	62	41	150	31.33	41.33	27.33
France	107	139	100	346	30.92	40.17	28.90
Germany	225	124	149	498	45.18	24.90	29.92
Greece	97	45	2	144	67.36	31.25	1.39
Hungary	19	16	4	39	48.72	41.03	10.26
Iceland	21	29	19	69	30.43	42.03	27.54
Ireland	236	600	322	1158	20.38	51.81	27.81
Italy	93	116	60	269	34.57	43.12	22.30
Netherlands	107	100	52	259	41.31	38.61	20.08
Norway	75	124	114	313	23.96	39.62	36.42
Portugal	51	111	107	269	18.96	41.26	39.78
Slovakia	2	4	5	11	18.18	36.36	45.45
Slovenia	39	58	52	149	26.17	38.93	34.90
Spain	180	322	83	585	30.77	55.04	14.19
Sweden	116	111	70	297	39.06	37.37	23.57
Switzerland	281	324	316	921	30.51	35.18	34.31
United Kingdom	119	274	158	551	21.60	49.73	28.68

Notes: This table reports the number of foreign-born immigrants in the full sample across destination countries and cohorts of arrival. The sample of reference is the restricted sample used in section 4.2 and excludes immigrants who migrated aged 15 or younger and those who migrated to their destination country before 1991.

Table 8: First-generation immigrants - Descriptive statistics - Cohort of arrival

Variable	1992-2001		2002-2009		2010-2022	
	Mean	St. Dev	Mean	St. Dev	Mean	St. Dev
<i>Panel A: Individual level characteristics</i>						
Age	47.33	10.48	38.88	10.07	34.86	10.72
Male	0.45	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.47	0.50
Married	0.69	0.46	0.61	0.49	0.49	0.50
At least one child	0.65	0.48	0.49	0.50	0.25	0.43
Employed	0.69	0.46	0.68	0.46	0.63	0.48
Unemployed for at least 3 months	0.44	0.50	0.42	0.49	0.37	0.48
Tertiary education	0.44	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.55	0.50
Partner tertiary education	0.26	0.44	0.28	0.45	0.29	0.45
Father employed	0.89	0.31	0.89	0.31	0.90	0.29
Father tertiary education	0.23	0.42	0.26	0.44	0.33	0.47
Feeling about hh income	2.16	0.93	2.06	0.90	1.94	0.85
Rural area	0.59	0.49	0.56	0.50	0.56	0.50
Speaks language of destination	0.56	0.50	0.44	0.50	0.40	0.49
Citizenship	0.52	0.50	0.26	0.44	0.10	0.30
No religion	0.32	0.46	0.30	0.47	0.36	0.48
Christian	0.34	0.47	0.36	0.48	0.33	0.47
Muslim	0.22	0.41	0.19	0.40	0.19	0.40
Other religion	0.12	0.32	0.14	0.34	0.11	0.31
Years since migration	17.67	4.65	10.06	4.07	4.06	2.70
<i>Panel B: Political attitudes</i>						
Redistribution	0.70	0.26	0.70	0.26	0.68	0.25
Gay rights	0.69	0.31	0.72	0.29	0.74	0.29
EU integration	0.54	0.27	0.58	0.26	0.60	0.26
Immigration policy	0.69	0.25	0.70	0.24	0.75	0.23
Political trust	0.52	0.26	0.55	0.24	0.59	0.24
Observations	2,420	2,420	3,078	3,078	2,006	2,006

Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for foreign-born immigrants across cohorts of arrival. The sample of reference is the restricted sample used in section 4.2 and excludes immigrants who migrated aged 15 or younger and those who migrated to their destination country before 1991. Panel A reports the mean and standard deviation for individual controls, while Panel B reports the average score and standard deviation of the five political issues used as dependent variables. Figures computed by the authors using survey weights.

Table 9: First-generation immigrants - Region of origin and cohorts


Area of origin	1992-2001	2002-2009	2010-2022	Total
Africa	169	270	168	607
Central Asia	124	191	148	463
East and South-East Asia	84	110	82	276
Eastern Europe	968	1,228	590	2,786
MENA	297	306	224	827
South America	208	308	210	726
Southern Europe	116	133	162	411
Western Europe	454	532	422	1,408
Observations	2,420	3,078	2,006	7,504

Notes: This table reports the number of foreign-born immigrants in the full sample across region of origin and cohorts of arrival. The sample of reference is the restricted sample used in section 4.2 and excludes immigrants who migrated aged 15 or younger and those who migrated to their destination country before 1991.

Table 10: List of NUTS units - Full sample

Region	Country	Region	Country	Region	Country
AT1	Austria	ES5	Spain	NL11	Netherlands
AT2	Austria	ES6	Spain	NL12	Netherlands
AT3	Austria	ES7	Spain	NL13	Netherlands
BE10	Belgium	FI19	Finland	NL21	Netherlands
BE21	Belgium	FI1B	Finland	NL22	Netherlands
BE22	Belgium	FI1C	Finland	NL23	Netherlands
BE23	Belgium	FI1D	Finland	NL31	Netherlands
BE24	Belgium	FI20	Finland	NL32	Netherlands
BE25	Belgium	FR1	France	NL33	Netherlands
BE31	Belgium	FR2	France	NL34	Netherlands
BE32	Belgium	FR3	France	NL41	Netherlands
BE33	Belgium	FR4	France	NL42	Netherlands
BE34	Belgium	FR5	France	NO01	Norway
BE35	Belgium	FR6	France	NO02	Norway
CH01	Switzerland	FR7	France	NO03	Norway
CH02	Switzerland	FR8	France	NO04	Norway
CH03	Switzerland	FRB	France	NO05	Norway
CH04	Switzerland	FRC	France	NO06	Norway
CH05	Switzerland	FRD	France	NO07	Norway
CH06	Switzerland	FRE	France	NO08	Norway
CH07	Switzerland	FRF	France	NO09	Norway
CZ01	Czech Republic	FRG	France	NO0A	Norway
CZ02	Czech Republic	FRH	France	SE11	Sweden
CZ03	Czech Republic	FRI	France	SE12	Sweden
CZ04	Czech Republic	FRJ	France	SE21	Sweden
CZ05	Czech Republic	FRK	France	SE22	Sweden
CZ06	Czech Republic	FRL	France	SE23	Sweden
CZ07	Czech Republic	GR1	Greece	SE31	Sweden
CZ08	Czech Republic	GR2	Greece	SE32	Sweden
DE1	Germany	GR3	Greece	SE33	Sweden
DE2	Germany	GR4	Greece	SI01	Slovenia
DE3	Germany	HR01	Croatia	SI02	Slovenia
DE4	Germany	HR02	Croatia	SI03	Slovenia
DE5	Germany	HR03	Croatia	SI04	Slovenia
DE6	Germany	HR04	Croatia	SK01	Slovakia
DE7	Germany	HR05	Croatia	SK02	Slovakia
DE8	Germany	HR06	Croatia	UKC	United Kingdom
DE9	Germany	HU1	Hungary	UKD	United Kingdom
DEA	Germany	HU2	Hungary	UKE	United Kingdom
DEB	Germany	IE01	Ireland	UKF	United Kingdom
DEC	Germany	IE02	Ireland	UKG	United Kingdom
DED	Germany	IE04	Ireland	UKH	United Kingdom
DEE	Germany	IE05	Ireland	UKI	United Kingdom
DEF	Germany	IE06	Ireland	UKJ	United Kingdom
DEG	Germany	ITC	Italy	UKK	United Kingdom
ES1	Spain	ITF	Italy	UKL	United Kingdom
ES2	Spain	ITG	Italy	UKM	United Kingdom
ES3	Spain	ITH	Italy	UKN	United Kingdom
ES4	Spain	ITI	Italy		

Figure 1: Regional data, share of foreign born



Notes: The figure plots the share of first-generation immigrants surveyed in the ESS sample against data from the OECD regional database. Shares are averaged over the period 2010-2019. R-squared is 0.8856.

Table 11: Between and Within Country Variation

	Mean (1)	Overall sd (2)	Between sd (3)	Within sd (4)
<i>Political preferences</i>				
Attitudes toward Redistribution	0.704	0.057	0.057	0.027
Attitudes toward Gay rights	0.801	0.085	0.121	0.028
Attitudes toward EU integration	0.506	0.060	0.053	0.028
Attitudes toward Immigration Policy	0.635	0.091	0.088	0.037
Trust in political institutions	0.473	0.090	0.106	0.030
<i>Macro variables</i>				
Total population	0.208	0.206	0.171	0.134
GDP (PPS, per capita)	0.325	0.215	0.133	0.189
Unemployment	0.203	0.171	0.158	0.091
Crude rate of net migration	0.512	0.207	0.152	0.161
Share of foreigners (ESS)	0.082	0.062	0.040	0.053

Notes: Panel A contain descriptive statistics for the regional culture variable, measured as the regional, weighted average of native-born political attitudes in a given region. The macro variables in Panel B are provided by the ESS multilevel database and averaged across rounds. Specifically, Column 1 reports the mean of each variable, while columns 2 to 4 contain respectively, the overall standard deviation, the between (cross-country) deviation and the within (cross-region) deviation.

Table 12: Correlation of political attitudes

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
Redistribution	1.0000	-	-	-	-
Gay rights	0.0200	1.0000	-	-	-
EU integration	-0.0002	0.1284	1.0000	-	-
Immigration policy	0.0043	0.2694	0.2570	1.0000	-
Trust in political institutions	-0.1355	0.1120	0.2061	0.2164	1.0000

Notes: The table reports correlation across political attitudes in the ESS data.

7.2 Analysis

Table A.1: Age at migration and political attitudes

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Immigrant generation					
2nd gen. immigrants	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.020*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)
Foreign-born immigr.	0.018** (0.007)	0.024*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.010)	0.066*** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)
δ (2 gen.)	.235	-.192	1.436	4.240	-26.025
δ (1 gen.)	-1.018	.404	3.528	1.250	-.033
Observations	172,170	170,918	134,929	169,505	171,244
R-squared	0.097	0.222	0.107	0.173	0.175

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences. Coefficients capture the estimated difference in political attitudes with natives with both parents born in their residence country. All specifications include the full set of individual controls as well as regional fixed effects, destination country-survey round fixed effects and account for survey design and population weights. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.2: Age at migration and political attitudes

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age at migration					
Age at migration < 15	0.015 (0.009)	0.054*** (0.009)	0.008 (0.013)	0.067*** (0.009)	-0.030*** (0.008)
Age at migration 15-25	0.026*** (0.008)	0.008 (0.011)	0.045*** (0.011)	0.068*** (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)
Age at migration > 25	0.011 (0.009)	0.000 (0.009)	0.052*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.009)	0.038*** (0.009)
δ (age at mig. < 15)	-1.605	-1.870	2.904	11.818	-1.254
δ (age at mig. 15 – 25)	-3.964	-.139	3.008	4.096	-.0231
δ (age at mig. > 25)	-1.282	-.006	1.574	2.545	.621
Observations	172,170	170,918	134,929	169,505	171,244
R-squared	0.104	0.227	0.113	0.181	0.182

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences. Coefficients capture the estimated difference in political attitudes between natives with both parents born in their residence country and foreign-born immigrants based on their age at migration. All specifications include the full set of individual controls as well as regional fixed effects, destination country-survey round fixed effects and account for survey design and population weights. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.3: Tenure and political attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Redistribution	Redistribution	Gay Rights	Gay Rights	EU	EU	Immigration	Immigration	Trust in Political	Trust in Political
					Integration	Integration	Policy	Policy	Institutions	Institutions
Cohort 1991-2001	0.005 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.030)	0.027 (0.029)	0.058 (0.038)	0.022 (0.031)	0.064 (0.045)	0.139*** (0.029)	0.141*** (0.039)	0.048** (0.024)	0.062 (0.046)
Cohort 2002-2009	0.010 (0.015)	0.022 (0.019)	0.012 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.023)	0.064*** (0.021)	0.051* (0.026)	0.123*** (0.018)	0.124*** (0.021)	0.043*** (0.016)	0.044*** (0.017)
Cohort 2010-2022	0.003 (0.014)	0.001 (0.020)	0.015 (0.017)	0.024 (0.025)	0.071*** (0.016)	0.063*** (0.021)	0.116*** (0.017)	0.114*** (0.021)	0.052*** (0.017)	0.041* (0.024)
Years since migration	0.000 (0.001)		0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)		-0.004*** (0.001)		-0.002 (0.001)	
Cohort 1991-2001 × ysm		0.001 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.004* (0.002)		-0.003 (0.003)
Cohort 2002-2009 × ysm		-0.001 (0.002)		0.002 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)		-0.004** (0.002)		-0.002 (0.001)
Cohort 2010-2022 × ysm		0.000 (0.003)		-0.002 (0.004)		0.002 (0.003)		-0.003 (0.003)		0.001 (0.004)
δ (ysm)	.158		.470		-.809		-2.722		-3.719	
δ (cohort 91-01 x ysm)		4.966		-7.072		-57.502		-2.453		-2.062
δ (cohort 02-09 x ysm)		-1.511		4.452		2.270		-2.162		-7.901
δ (cohort 10-22 x ysm)		.336		3.163		-7.386		5.741		-.861
<i>p-value on test of equal coef.</i> <i>(cohort 91-01 VS 02-09)</i>	0.639	0.272	0.366	0.114	0.014	0.802	0.270	0.646	0.663	0.690
<i>p-value on test of equal coef.</i> <i>(cohort 91-01 VS 10-22)</i>	0.892	0.602	0.602	0.368	0.062	0.970	0.329	0.530	0.530	0.821
<i>p-value on test of equal coef.</i> <i>(cohort 02-09 VS 10-22)</i>	0.460	0.339	0.820	0.203	0.619	0.692	0.608	0.663	0.424	0.903
Observations	165684	165684	164451	164451	129852	129852	163076	163076	164853	164853
R-squared	0.106	0.106	0.227	0.227	0.115	0.115	0.184	0.184	0.184	0.184

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences between 0 and 1. The cohort coefficients capture the initial migrant-to-native opinion gap between first-generation immigrants and native-born individuals at the time of migration for each cohort of arrival. The "years since migration" coefficient reports the marginal effect of an additional year since migration on the migrant-to-native gap. The sample includes all native-born individuals (both natives and second-generation immigrants) and first-generation immigrants who were older than 15 at the time of migration, migrated to their destination country after 1991. All specifications include the full set of individual controls, regional fixed-effects and destination country-survey round fixed effects and account for survey design and population weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.4: Tenure, age at migration and political attitudes

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age at migration					
15-25 at migration	-0.001 (0.016)	0.005 (0.024)	0.085*** (0.024)	0.145*** (0.019)	0.053** (0.024)
> 25 at migration	0.008 (0.018)	0.023 (0.017)	0.060*** (0.018)	0.098*** (0.019)	0.046*** (0.016)
<i>p-value on test of equal coef.</i> (Age at mig. 15-25 VS > 25)	0.642	0.367	0.320	0.003	0.692
15-25 at mig. × ysm	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)
> 25 at mig. × ysm	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
<i>p-value on test of equal coef.</i> (15-25 × ysm VS > 25 × ysm)	0.152	0.173	0.072	0.024	0.010
δ (15 - 25 × ysm)	1.407	.735	1.992	-1.643	2.535
δ (> 25 × ysm)	215.158	.682	1.192	10.139	-.137
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	165684	164451	129852	163076	164853
R-squared	0.106	0.227	0.115	0.183	0.184

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences between 0 and 1. The Age at migration coefficients capture the initial migrant-to-native opinion gap at the time of migration between first-generation immigrants and native-born individuals for each category of foreign-born immigrant. The interaction of the *ysm* and *Age at migration* coefficients reports the marginal effect of an additional year since migration on the migrant-to-native gap for each category. The sample includes all native-born individuals (both natives and second-generation immigrants) and first-generation immigrants who were older than 15 at the time of migration, migrated to their destination country after 1991. All specifications include the full set of individual controls, regional fixed-effects and destination country-survey round fixed effects and account for survey design and population weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.5: Regional culture

	Redistribution	Redistribution	Gay Rights	Gay Rights	EU	EU	Immigration	Immigration	Trust in Political	Trust in Political
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Integration	Integration	Policy	Policy	Institutions	Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Regional culture	0.318*** (0.103)	0.419*** (0.114)	0.233** (0.115)	0.173 (0.129)	0.050 (0.128)	0.219 (0.178)	0.272*** (0.084)	0.374** (0.154)	0.220* (0.124)	0.336** (0.150)
GDP per capita		0.063** (0.029)		-0.012 (0.026)		0.009 (0.036)		0.000 (0.048)		-0.044 (0.034)
Total population		0.008 (0.032)		0.015 (0.025)		-0.032 (0.035)		-0.011 (0.028)		-0.050 (0.030)
Unemp. rate		0.017 (0.031)		-0.002 (0.036)		0.051 (0.041)		0.015 (0.036)		-0.028 (0.045)
Rate of net mig.		-0.014 (0.024)		0.046* (0.026)		-0.012 (0.023)		-0.007 (0.020)		-0.027 (0.021)
Share of foreign-born		-0.010 (0.026)		-0.018 (0.026)		-0.050 (0.033)		-0.032 (0.034)		0.048 (0.033)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
NUTS regions	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120
Observations	11928	11928	11921	11921	9661	9661	11873	11873	11390	11390
R-squared	0.078	0.079	0.228	0.229	0.083	0.083	0.099	0.099	0.196	0.197

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences between 0 and 1. Each column represents a different regression. All specifications include the full set of individual controls, destination country-survey round fixed effects, and cohort fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.6: Regional culture, age at migration and tenure

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Tenure					
Reg. cult. × Tenure ≤ 18 yrs	0.534*** (0.126)	0.164 (0.133)	0.119 (0.198)	0.256* (0.151)	0.285* (0.152)
Reg. cult. × Tenure > 18 yrs	0.336*** (0.121)	0.163 (0.136)	0.304* (0.177)	0.513*** (0.163)	0.390** (0.149)
<i>p-value on test of equal coef.</i>	0.044	0.988	0.088	0.000	0.029
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
NUTS regions	120	120	120	120	120
Observations	11928	11921	9661	11873	11390
R-squared	0.106	0.227	0.115	0.183	0.184
Age at migration					
Reg. cult. × Age at mig. ≤ 25 yrs	0.393*** (0.113)	0.197 (0.129)	0.245 (0.184)	0.406*** (0.154)	0.361** (0.152)
Reg. cult. × Age at mig. > 25 yrs	0.483*** (0.131)	0.108 (0.143)	0.195 (0.184)	0.331** (0.163)	0.281* (0.151)
<i>p-value on test of equal coef.</i>	0.303	0.299	0.563	0.314	0.051
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
NUTS regions	120	120	120	120	120
Observations	11928	11921	9661	11873	11390
R-squared	0.082	0.231	0.085	0.099	0.204

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences between 0 and 1. The sample is split based on the median values of tenure and age at migration among foreign-born immigrants. All specifications include the full set of individual controls, destination country-survey round fixed effects, and cohort fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.7: Peer effects

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A: Baseline</i>					
Peer preferences	0.098* (0.052)	0.202*** (0.054)	0.084 (0.053)	0.019 (0.042)	0.124** (0.055)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	11928	11921	9661	11873	11390
R-squared	0.097	0.246	0.104	0.114	0.218
<i>Panel B: Tenure</i>					
Peer pref × Tenure ≤ 18 yrs	0.105* (0.059)	0.180*** (0.062)	0.074 (0.062)	-0.082* (0.047)	0.079 (0.061)
Peer pref × Tenure > 18 yrs	0.093 (0.065)	0.219*** (0.064)	0.096 (0.069)	0.110** (0.050)	0.170*** (0.056)
<i>p-value on test of equal coef.</i>	0.857	0.540	0.778	0.000	0.022
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	11928	11921	9661	11873	11390
R-squared	0.097	0.246	0.104	0.116	0.218
<i>Panel C: Age at migration</i>					
Peer pref × Age at migration ≤ 25	0.111* (0.063)	0.241*** (0.058)	0.112* (0.063)	0.071 (0.047)	0.166*** (0.060)
Peer pref × Age at migration > 25	0.079 (0.057)	0.136* (0.070)	0.048 (0.060)	-0.039 (0.051)	0.062 (0.055)
<i>p-value on test of equal coef.</i>	0.606	0.108	0.312	0.032	0.007
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	11928	11921	9661	11873	11390
R-squared	0.098	0.246	0.104	0.115	0.219

Notes: The table reports estimates from model 4. Dependent variables are normalized political preferences. The sample is split based on the median values of tenure and age at migration among foreign-born immigrants. Peer preferences are constructed as the average preferences of natives-born individuals from the same peer group as immigrants. Peer groups are constructed based on NUTS region, dwelling, age and employment status of respondents. All regressions include a full set of individual controls, destination country-survey round fixed effects, and cohort fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the peer group level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

7.3 Supplementary Tables

Table S.1 - Age at migration and political attitudes, individual controls

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Immigrant generation × religion					
2nd gen. immigrants	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.020*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)
Foreign-born immig.	0.018** (0.007)	0.024*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.010)	0.066*** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)
Age	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Male	-0.032*** (0.002)	-0.051*** (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	0.018*** (0.002)
Has a child	-0.001 (0.003)	0.009*** (0.002)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.002)
Married or living with a partner	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Tertiary education	-0.018*** (0.003)	0.035*** (0.002)	0.050*** (0.004)	0.072*** (0.003)	0.040*** (0.003)
In the labour force and employed	-0.007*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)
Partner doing paid work	-0.004 (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)
Partner with tertiary ed.	-0.018*** (0.003)	0.022*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.003)	0.039*** (0.003)	0.026*** (0.003)
Has unemployment exp. > 3 months	0.032*** (0.002)	0.018*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	-0.020*** (0.002)
Lives in rural area	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)
Log household size	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	0.005* (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)
Father working when respondent 14	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)
Father with tertiary ed.	-0.024*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.003)	0.035*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.003)
Feeling about household's income	0.034*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.032*** (0.002)	-0.036*** (0.002)	-0.045*** (0.002)
Citizen of country	0.002 (0.006)	0.020** (0.009)	-0.031*** (0.007)	-0.018*** (0.006)	-0.033*** (0.006)
Christian	-0.024*** (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.021*** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.003)
Muslims	0.028*** (0.009)	-0.130*** (0.010)	0.006 (0.012)	0.014 (0.009)	0.000 (0.011)
Other religion	0.009 (0.010)	0.004 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.016)
Observations	172,170	170,918	134,929	169,505	171,244
R-squared	0.097	0.222	0.107	0.173	0.175

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences. Coefficients capture the estimated difference in political attitudes with natives with both parents born in their residence country. All specifications include regional fixed effects, destination country-survey round fixed effects and account for survey design and population weights. Reference category for religion: native individuals with no religious affiliations. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.2 - Age at migration and political attitudes, by religious affiliations

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Immigrant generation × religion					
2nd gen. × No religion	0.008* (0.005)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.013* (0.007)	0.032*** (0.006)	-0.005 (0.005)
2nd gen. × Christian	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.013** (0.006)	-0.003 (0.005)
2nd gen. × Muslims	0.050*** (0.013)	-0.139*** (0.018)	0.003 (0.014)	0.030** (0.015)	-0.039*** (0.011)
2nd gen. × Other rel.	-0.005 (0.021)	-0.031** (0.014)	0.026 (0.025)	-0.008 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.019)
1st gen. × No religion	0.018** (0.008)	0.043*** (0.009)	0.040*** (0.010)	0.069*** (0.007)	-0.009 (0.008)
1st gen. × Christian	0.018** (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.026** (0.011)	0.064*** (0.009)	0.002 (0.008)
1st gen. × Muslims	0.050*** (0.015)	-0.071*** (0.014)	0.074*** (0.019)	0.098*** (0.012)	0.030* (0.017)
1st gen. × Other rel.	0.039* (0.021)	0.051* (0.028)	0.037 (0.026)	0.036* (0.021)	0.036 (0.025)
Observations	172,170	170,918	134,929	169,505	171,244
R-squared	0.097	0.222	0.107	0.173	0.175

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences. Coefficients capture the estimated difference in political attitudes with natives with both parents born in their residence country. All specifications include individual controls, regional fixed effects, destination country-survey round fixed effects and account for survey design and population weights. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.3: Age at migration - Exogenous controls

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age at migration					
Age at migration < 15	0.012 (0.010)	0.043*** (0.009)	0.023* (0.012)	0.080*** (0.008)	-0.012 (0.009)
Age at migration 15-25	0.026*** (0.006)	-0.014 (0.009)	0.058*** (0.010)	0.078*** (0.007)	0.015* (0.009)
Age at migration > 25	0.010 (0.008)	-0.025*** (0.006)	0.066*** (0.009)	0.071*** (0.007)	0.055*** (0.008)
Observations	172,170	170,918	134,929	169,505	171,244
R-squared	0.074	0.185	0.093	0.157	0.138

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences. Coefficients capture the difference in political attitudes with natives with both parents born in their residence country. All specifications include the following controls: age, gender, tertiary education, father's employment status and education, as well as respondent's country of origin. Specifications also include regional fixed effects, destination country-survey round fixed effects and account for survey design and population weights. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.4: Age at migration - Matched sample

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Age at migration</i>					
Age at migration < 15	-0.013 (0.010)	0.036*** (0.008)	-0.006 (0.011)	0.068*** (0.009)	-0.025*** (0.009)
Age at migration 15-25	-0.005 (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)	0.024* (0.013)	0.068*** (0.009)	0.003 (0.009)
Age at migration > 25	-0.027*** (0.009)	0.001 (0.011)	0.029** (0.013)	0.068*** (0.011)	0.034*** (0.011)
Observations	20,017	19,972	15,867	19,900	19,452
R-squared	0.131	0.267	0.119	0.165	0.247

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences. Coefficients capture the difference in political attitudes with natives with both parents born in their residence country. Coefficients are estimated on native-born and foreign-born respondents included the matched sample, which is balanced on observable individual and parental characteristics. All specifications include the full set of individual controls as well as regional fixed effects, destination country-survey round fixed effects and account for survey design and population weights. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.5: Age at migration - Multiple hypothesis testing

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age at migration					
2nd gen. immigrants	-0.004	-0.000	0.006	0.022***	-0.004
<i>p-value</i>	(.373)	(.940)	(.186)	(.000)	(.251)
<i>Romano-Wolf p-value</i>	(.970)	(.980)	(.920)	(.010)	(.921)
Age at migration < 15	0.015	0.054***	0.008	0.067***	-0.030***
<i>p-value</i>	(.167)	(.000)	(.432)	(.000)	(.000)
<i>Romano-Wolf p-value</i>	(.921)	(.010)	(.970)	(.010)	(.010)
Age at migration 15-25	0.026***	0.008	0.045***	0.068***	-0.001
<i>p-value</i>	(.003)	(.234)	(.000)	(.000)	(.896)
<i>Romano-Wolf p-value</i>	(.030)	(.921)	(.010)	(.010)	(.980)
Age at migration > 25	0.011	0.000	0.052***	0.061***	0.038***
<i>p-value</i>	(.289)	(.755)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
<i>Romano-Wolf p-value</i>	(.921)	(.970)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)
Observations	172,170	170,918	134,929	169,505	171,244
R-squared	0.074	0.185	0.093	0.157	0.138

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences. Coefficients capture the estimated difference in political attitudes with natives with both parents born in their residence country from model 1. All specifications control for age, gender, whether or not the respondent is married and has children, tertiary education, citizenship, whether the respondent lives in an urban area, the respondent's assessment of his or her financial situation, the size of the respondent's household, individual employment status, the level of education and employment status of the respondent's partner, father's employment status and education, whether the host country's language is spoken at home, whether the respondent has ever been unemployed for a period of more than 3 months as well as respondent's region of origin and religious affiliation. Specifications also include destination country-survey roundfixed effects and account for survey design and population weights. For each coefficient, robust p-values and Romano-Wolf stepdown adjusted p-values, which control the FWER and allows for dependence among p-values by bootstrap resampling, are reported. Romano-Wolf p-values are computed using 1000 bootstrap replications. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.6: Tenure - Exogenous controls

	Redistribution	Redistribution	Gay Rights	Gay Rights	EU	EU	Immigration	Immigration	Trust in Political	Trust in Political
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Cohort 1991-2001	0.005 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.031)	0.011 (0.027)	0.054 (0.034)	0.031 (0.028)	0.065 (0.047)	0.136*** (0.030)	0.131*** (0.043)	0.054** (0.025)	0.059 (0.044)
Cohort 2002-2009	0.004 (0.014)	0.017 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.034 (0.023)	0.076*** (0.017)	0.061** (0.024)	0.122*** (0.018)	0.123*** (0.020)	0.057*** (0.014)	0.055*** (0.018)
Cohort 2010-2022	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.021)	0.085*** (0.014)	0.082*** (0.018)	0.115*** (0.014)	0.120*** (0.017)	0.069*** (0.015)	0.064*** (0.021)
Years since migration	-0.000 (0.001)		0.000 (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)		-0.004** (0.001)		-0.002 (0.001)	
Cohort 1991-2001 × ysm		0.001 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.003)		-0.004 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)
Cohort 2002-2009 × ysm		-0.001 (0.002)		0.003 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)		-0.004** (0.002)		-0.002 (0.001)
Cohort 2010-2022 × ysm		0.000 (0.003)		-0.001 (0.004)		-0.000 (0.003)		-0.005 (0.003)		-0.001 (0.004)
Observations	165,689	165,689	164,456	164,456	129,857	129,857	163,081	163,081	164,858	164,858
R-squared	0.076	0.076	0.187	0.187	0.095	0.095	0.158	0.158	0.139	0.139

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences between 0 and 1. The cohort coefficients capture the initial migrant-to-native opinion gap between first-generation immigrants and native-born individuals at the time of migration for each cohort of arrival. The "years since migration" coefficient reports the marginal effect of an additional year since migration on the migrant-to-native gap. The sample includes all native-born individuals (both natives and second-generation immigrants) and first-generation immigrants who were older than 15 at the time of migration, migrated to their destination country after 1991. All specifications include the following controls: age, gender, tertiary education, father's employment status and education, as well as respondent's country of origin, regional fixed-effects and destination country-survey round fixed effects, and account for survey design and population weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.7: Tenure - Exogenous controls

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Age at migration</i>					
15-25 migration	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.017 (0.019)	0.099*** (0.023)	0.144*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.021)
15-25 at mig. \times ysm	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)
> 25 at migration	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.013)	0.071*** (0.015)	0.100*** (0.016)	0.064*** (0.015)
> 25 at mig. \times ysm	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	165684	164451	129852	163076	164853
R-squared	0.089	0.211	0.103	0.170	0.155

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences between 0 and 1. The Age at migration coefficients capture the initial migrant-to-native opinion gap at the time of migration between first-generation immigrants and native-born individuals for each category of foreign-born immigrant. The interaction of the *ysm* and *Age at migration* coefficients reports the marginal effect of an additional year since migration on the migrant-to-native gap for each category. All specifications include the following controls: age, gender, tertiary education, father's employment status and education, as well as respondent's country of origin. Specifications also include regional fixed effects, destination country-survey round fixed effects and account for survey design and population weights. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.8: Tenure – Matched sample

	Redistribution	Redistribution	Gay Rights	Gay Rights	EU	EU	Immigration	Immigration	Immigration	Trust in Political	Trust in Political
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Integration	Integration	Policy	Policy	Policy	Institutions	Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(10)
Cohort 1991-2001	-0.053*** (0.019)	-0.066*** (0.022)	0.014 (0.021)	0.010 (0.025)	0.067*** (0.021)	0.083*** (0.030)	0.103*** (0.024)	0.087*** (0.028)	0.024 (0.017)	0.020 (0.023)	
Cohort 2002-2009	-0.038*** (0.013)	-0.028 (0.017)	0.007 (0.016)	0.006 (0.019)	0.062*** (0.015)	0.059*** (0.018)	0.092*** (0.018)	0.093*** (0.021)	0.037*** (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	
Cohort 2010-2022	-0.039*** (0.011)	-0.042*** (0.014)	-0.001 (0.014)	0.003 (0.017)	0.049*** (0.014)	0.044*** (0.016)	0.083*** (0.015)	0.093*** (0.016)	0.040*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.015)	
Years since migration	0.001 (0.001)		0.000 (0.001)		-0.003** (0.001)		-0.002* (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)		
Cohort 1991-2002 × ysm		0.002 (0.001)		0.000 (0.001)		-0.003** (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)	
Cohort 2002-2009 × ysm		0.000 (0.001)		0.000 (0.001)		-0.002 (0.001)		-0.002 (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)	
Cohort 2010-2022 × ysm		0.002 (0.003)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.004* (0.002)		-0.002 (0.003)	
Observations	13536	13536	13510	13510	10795	10795	13476	13476	13066	13066	
R-squared	0.123	0.123	0.251	0.251	0.102	0.102	0.157	0.157	0.246	0.246	

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences between 0 and 1. The cohort coefficients capture the initial migrant-to-native opinion gap between first-generation immigrants and native-born individuals at the time of migration for each cohort of arrival. The "years since migration" coefficient reports the marginal effect of an additional year since migration on the migrant-to-native gap. The sample includes native-born individuals (both natives and second-generation immigrants) from the matched sample as well as first-generation immigrants from the matched sample who were older than 15 at the time of migration, migrated to their destination country after 1991. All specifications include the full set of individual controls, regional fixed-effects, destination country-round fixed effects, and account for survey design and population weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.9: Tenure - Matched sample

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Age at migration</i>					
15-25 at migration	-0.016 (0.014)	0.005 (0.016)	0.063*** (0.014)	0.111*** (0.016)	0.035** (0.014)
15-25 at migration \times ysm	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
> 25 at mig.	-0.045*** (0.012)	-0.003 (0.015)	0.041** (0.017)	0.069*** (0.016)	0.037*** (0.012)
> 25 at mig. \times ysm	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	13536	13510	10795	13476	13066
R-squared	0.124	0.251	0.103	0.157	0.248

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences between 0 and 1. The Age at migration coefficients capture the initial migrant-to-native opinion gap at the time of migration between first-generation immigrants and native-born individuals for each category of foreign-born immigrant. The interaction of the *ysm* and *Age at migration* coefficients reports the marginal effect of an additional year since migration on the migrant-to-native gap for each category. Coefficients are estimated on native-born and foreign-born respondents included in the matched sample, which is balanced on observable individual and parental characteristics. All specifications include the full set of controls, regional fixed effects, destination country-survey round fixed effects and account for survey design and population weights. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.10: Tenure - Multiple hypothesis testing

	Redistribution	Redistribution	Gay Rights	Gay Rights	EU	EU	Immigration	Immigration	Trust in Political	Trust in Political
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Years since migration	0.000		0.000		-0.000		-0.004***		-0.002	
<i>p-value</i>	(.903)		(.978)		(.939)		(.000)		(.117)	
<i>Romano-Wolf p-value</i>	(1)		(1)		(1)		(.020)		(.584)	
Yrs since mig. × Age at mig. 15-25		0.001		0.001		-0.002		-0.006***		-0.004**
<i>p-value</i>		(.590)		(.757)		(.614)		(.001)		(.007)
<i>Romano-Wolf p-value</i>		(1)		(1)		(1)		(.040)		(.089)
Yrs since mig. × Age at mig. > 25		-0.001		-0.001		0.001		-0.003*		-0.000
<i>p-value</i>		(.464)		(.800)		(.725)		(.000)		(.729)
<i>Romano-Wolf p-value</i>		(.970)		(1)		(1)		(.020)		(1)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	165684	165684	164451	164451	129852	129852	163076	163076	164853	164853
R-squared	0.076	0.076	0.187	0.187	0.095	0.095	0.158	0.158	0.139	0.139

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences between 0 and 1. The cohort coefficients capture the initial migrant-to-native opinion gap between first-generation immigrants and native-born individuals at the time of migration for each cohort of arrival. The "years since migration" coefficient reports the marginal effect of an additional year at destination on the migrant-to-native gap estimated from model 2. The sample includes all native-born individuals (both natives and second-generation immigrants) and first-generation immigrants who were older than 15 at the time of migration and migrated to their destination country after 1991. All specifications include the full set of individual controls, destination country-survey round as well as cohort of arrival fixed effects and account for survey design and population weights. For each coefficient, robust p-values and Romano-Wolf stepdown adjusted p-values, which control the FWER and allows for dependence among p-values by bootstrap resampling, are reported. Romano-Wolf p-values are computed using 1000 bootstrap replications. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.11: Tenure - Return migration

	Redistribution (1)	Redistribution (2)	Gay Rights (3)	Gay Rights (4)	EU Integration (5)	EU Integration (6)	Immigration Policy (7)	Immigration Policy (8)	Trust in Political Institutions (9)	Trust in Political Institutions (10)
Cohort 1991-2001	0.021 (0.048)	-0.022 (0.059)	0.020 (0.064)	0.021 (0.063)	0.037 (0.069)	0.107* (0.062)	0.154*** (0.051)	0.069 (0.076)	0.046 (0.054)	0.108 (0.077)
Cohort 2002-2009	0.052 (0.041)	0.047 (0.042)	-0.019 (0.050)	-0.037 (0.053)	0.030 (0.052)	0.018 (0.059)	0.112*** (0.036)	0.107*** (0.034)	0.048 (0.042)	0.042 (0.041)
Cohort 2010-2022	0.041 (0.036)	0.053 (0.041)	0.012 (0.037)	0.027 (0.048)	0.026 (0.036)	0.023 (0.041)	0.110*** (0.031)	0.129*** (0.034)	0.040 (0.039)	0.034 (0.043)
Years since migration	-0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.003)		-0.002 (0.003)		-0.004* (0.002)		-0.003 (0.002)	
Cohort 1991-2001 × ysm		0.002 (0.003)		0.001 (0.003)		-0.006* (0.003)		0.001 (0.003)		-0.007 (0.004)
Cohort 2002-2009 × ysm		-0.000 (0.003)		0.003 (0.004)		-0.001 (0.004)		-0.004 (0.003)		-0.002 (0.003)
Cohort 2010-2022 × ysm		-0.004 (0.004)		-0.003 (0.007)		-0.001 (0.005)		-0.010** (0.004)		-0.001 (0.005)
Observations	160553	160553	159307	159307	125693	125693	157941	157941	160031	160031
R-squared	0.076	0.076	0.187	0.187	0.095	0.095	0.158	0.158	0.139	0.139

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences between 0 and 1. The cohort coefficients capture the initial migrant-to-native opinion gap between first-generation immigrants and native-born individuals at the time of migration for each cohort of arrival. The "years since migration" coefficient reports the marginal effect of an additional year since migration on the migrant-to-native gap. The sample includes all native-born individuals (both natives and second-generation immigrants) and first-generation immigrants who were i) older than 15 at the time of migration, ii) migrated to their destination country after 1991, iii) not citizen of a EU member country and iv) migrated further than 1,500 km away from their home country. All specifications include the following controls: age, gender, tertiary education, father's employment status and education, as well as respondent's country of origin, regional fixed-effects and destination country-survey round fixed effects, and account for survey design and population weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.12: Tenure - Return migration

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Age at migration</i>					
15-25 at migration	0.021 (0.035)	0.005 (0.048)	0.048 (0.044)	0.151*** (0.035)	0.069 (0.042)
15-25 at migration \times ysm	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.006 (0.001)	-0.007** (0.001)	-0.008** (0.001)
> 25 at mig.	0.058 (0.040) (0.002)	0.017 (0.033) (0.003)	0.006 (0.040) (0.004)	0.075** (0.030) (0.003)	0.010 (0.040) (0.003)
> 25 at mig. \times ysm	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	160553	159307	125693	157941	160031
R-squared	0.107	0.226	0.117	0.186	0.184

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences between 0 and 1. The Age at migration coefficients capture the initial migrant-to-native opinion gap at the time of migration between first-generation immigrants and native-born individuals for each category of foreign-born immigrant. The interaction of the *ysm* and *Age at migration* coefficients reports the marginal effect of an additional year since migration on the migrant-to-native gap for each category. The sample includes all native-born individuals (both natives and second-generation immigrants) and first-generation immigrants who were i) older than 15 at the time of migration, ii) migrated to their destination country after 1991, iii) not citizen of a EU member country and iv) migrated further than 1,500 km away from their home country. All specifications include the following controls: age, gender, tertiary education, father's employment status and education, as well as respondent's country of origin. Specifications also include regional fixed effects, destination country-survey round fixed effects and account for survey design and population weights. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.13: Regional culture - Exogenous controls

	Redistribution	Redistribution	Gay Rights	Gay Rights	EU	EU	Immigration	Immigration	Immigration	Trust in Political	Trust in Political
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
Regional culture	0.397*** (0.101)	0.478*** (0.116)	0.209* (0.122)	0.153 (0.131)	0.151 (0.127)	0.265 (0.180)	0.313*** (0.086)	0.383** (0.162)	0.317** (0.126)	0.355** (0.148)	
GDP per capita		0.057** (0.028)		-0.014 (0.025)		0.036 (0.038)		0.019 (0.049)		-0.022 (0.035)	
Total pop.		0.006 (0.031)		0.001 (0.024)		-0.034 (0.034)		-0.018 (0.029)		-0.045 (0.029)	
Unemployment		0.024 (0.033)		-0.015 (0.035)		0.069 (0.042)		0.024 (0.037)		-0.021 (0.047)	
Rate of net mig.		-0.011 (0.025)		0.054** (0.027)		-0.014 (0.023)		-0.010 (0.020)		-0.029 (0.020)	
Share of foreign-born		-0.002 (0.026)		-0.024 (0.027)		-0.056 (0.035)		-0.040 (0.035)		0.045 (0.035)	
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
NUTS regions	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	
Observations	11928	11928	11921	11921	9661	9661	11873	11873	11390	11390	
R-squared	0.064	0.065	0.200	0.201	0.073	0.073	0.089	0.089	0.178	0.178	

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences between 0 and 1. Only coefficients estimated for time-invariant regional variables are reported. Each column represents a different regression. All specifications include the following controls: age, gender, tertiary education, father's employment status and education, as well as respondent's region of origin. Specifications also include destination country-survey round fixed effects and cohort fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.14: Regional culture, age at migration and tenure - exogenous controls

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Tenure					
Reg. cult. × Tenure ≤ 18 yrs	0.590*** (0.128)	0.127 (0.137)	0.164 (0.200)	0.257 (0.157)	0.306** (0.150)
Reg. cult. × Tenure > 18 yrs	0.387*** (0.123)	0.144 (0.137)	0.340* (0.178)	0.523*** (0.170)	0.422*** (0.145)
<i>p-value on test of equal coef.</i>	0.038	0.874	0.099	0.000	0.018
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
NUTS regions	120	120	120	120	120
Observations	11928	11921	9661	11873	11390
R-squared	0.067	0.206	0.079	0.093	0.189
Age at migration					
Reg. cult. × Age at mig. ≤ 25 yrs	0.441*** (0.117)	0.175 (0.130)	0.291 (0.186)	0.406** (0.161)	0.382** (0.149)
Reg. cult. × Age at mig. > 25 yrs	0.543*** (0.130)	0.072 (0.143)	0.226 (0.186)	0.342** (0.170)	0.315** (0.148)
<i>p-value on test of equal coef.</i>	0.252	0.245	0.442	0.383	0.086
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
NUTS regions	120	120	120	120	120
Observations	11928	11921	9661	11873	11390
R-squared	0.067	0.206	0.078	0.092	0.189

Dependent variables are normalized political preferences between 0 and 1. Only coefficients estimated for regional culture based on the interaction with tenure and age at migration are reported. All specifications include the following controls: age, gender, tertiary education, father's employment status and education, as well as respondent's region of origin. Specifications also include, destination country-survey round fixed effects and cohort fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S.15: Peer effects - exogenous controls

	Redistribution	Gay Rights	EU Integration	Immigration Policy	Trust in Political Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A: Baseline</i>					
Peer preferences	0.106** (0.052)	0.215*** (0.057)	0.075 (0.053)	0.028 (0.041)	0.118** (0.055)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	11928	11921	9661	11873	11390
R-squared	0.078	0.188	0.095	0.104	0.199
<i>Panel B: Tenure</i>					
Peer pref × Tenure ≤ 18 yrs	0.120** (0.060)	0.196*** (0.069)	0.070 (0.062)	-0.074 (0.046)	0.065 (0.061)
Peer pref × Tenure > 18 yrs	0.095 (0.064)	0.230*** (0.071)	0.083 (0.068)	0.122** (0.049)	0.172*** (0.056)
<i>p-value on test of equal coef.</i>	0.708	0.676	0.860	0.000	0.011
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	11928	11921	9661	11873	11390
R-squared	0.078	0.188	0.095	0.105	0.200
<i>Panel C: Age at migration</i>					
Peer pref × Age at migration ≤ 25	0.118* (0.061)	0.252*** (0.061)	0.098 (0.064)	0.079* (0.046)	0.162*** (0.060)
Peer pref × Age at migration > 25	0.090 (0.058)	0.152** (0.073)	0.044 (0.060)	-0.028 (0.050)	0.054 (0.055)
<i>p-value on test of equal coef.</i>	0.656	0.139	0.401	0.037	0.005
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	11928	11921	9661	11873	11390
R-squared	0.078	0.188	0.096	0.104	0.201

Notes: The table reports estimates from model 4. Dependent variables are normalized political preferences. Peer preferences are constructed as the average preferences of natives-born individuals from the same peer group as immigrants. Peer groups are constructed based on region, survey round, dwelling, age and employment status. All specifications include the following controls: age, gender, tertiary education, father's employment status and education, as well as respondent's region of origin. Specifications also include destination country-survey round fixed effects and cohort fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the peer group level in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Sub-national analysis

In the sub-national analysis, peer groups are constructed based on the following natives' characteristics:

Region: We use the same combination of NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions as in the regional analysis. The detailed list of regions can be found in Table 11.

Dwelling: This variable is constructed based on the variable *domicil* describing respondents' dwelling and available from all rounds of the European Social Survey (2010-2020). We use respondents' answer to create subregional geographical clusters from the more to the least urban. Respondents living in a Big city or in the Suburbs or outskirts are coded 1, those living in a Town or a small city are coded 2, and those living in a Country village, in the countryside or in a farm are coded as 3.

Age: Four age bands: 15-30, 30-50, 50-65, and over 65, are created using respondents' age.

Labour market position: We use the variable "pdwrk" indicating whether respondents' were doing any paid work in the week before he or she was interviewed by the ESS. The variable is coded 1 if the respondent said "yes", and 0 otherwise.