Bipartisan/Range Voting in Two Rounds Reaches a Promising Balance between Efficiency and Strategy-Resistance - Université catholique de Lille Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2023

Bipartisan/Range Voting in Two Rounds Reaches a Promising Balance between Efficiency and Strategy-Resistance

Résumé

In the quest to develop a more effective and representative electoral system that offers a higher global satisfaction while also resisting strategic voting, this paper introduces the Bipartisan/Range method. This electoral system operates in two separate rounds: a first round where voters rank candidates, and if no Condorcet winner emerges, a second round where voters score candidates within a small head set known as the bipartisan set. The proposed method takes inspiration from randomized Condorcet voting system, probably the most strategy-resistant Condorcet methods, but eliminates the non-determinism while improving efficiency in the case of paradoxes. By introducing an unpredictable second round spaced in time and prohibiting predictive surveys, voters face difficulties in anticipating paradoxes, and insincere votes carry inherent risks. Furthermore, the Bipartisan set's limited size mitigates the range voting problem of exaggerated votes. Thus, the method has the potential to be both efficient in reflecting voters' preferences and resistant to strategic voting, exceeding expectations from Arrow's theorem. The method's versatility allows for extensions to multiple candidates, enhancing its applicability across various electoral contexts. Additionally, we have developed BipartiVox, an online platform specifically designed to conduct elections using the Bipartisan/Range method, making it accessible to a wider audience. In conclusion, the Bipartisan/Range method represents a substantial contribution to the field of voting systems, providing a practical, strategy-resistant, and efficient alternative that aligns closely with genuine voter preferences.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
preprints202309.0388.v1.pdf (657.86 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-04352698 , version 1 (19-12-2023)

Identifiants

Citer

Samuel Boudet. Bipartisan/Range Voting in Two Rounds Reaches a Promising Balance between Efficiency and Strategy-Resistance. 2023. ⟨hal-04352698⟩

Collections

FMMS
10 Consultations
8 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More